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 5
INTRODUCTION
When the Institute of Women’s Studies launched its first 
undergraduate course in 1996, there was already an absence on 
campus — the Israeli occupation’s increasing restrictions on the 
mobility of Gazan students had already led to a sharp decline 
in their ability to study at Birzeit University. In the 1980s, 
Gazans made up about one-quarter of the student body and the 
exchange among students from various locales in the West Bank 
and Gaza enriched campus life and students’ understanding of 
their society. By 2000, there were only 350 students from Gaza 
at the University and by 2005 less than forty. Despite a number 
of human rights campaigns focusing on the right to education 
– which continue to this day – the Israel occupation’s regime of 
spatial segregation, with its checkpoints, permits, barriers and 
borders has forced Palestinian students, teachers and researchers 
to be divided from themselves.
Even before Israel’s continuing siege of Gaza and the January 
2009 aggression, the consequences of the separation of the West 
Bank and Gaza for Palestinian education were dire. Research 
cannot be conducted in enclaves; Gaza students need to expand 
their horizons whether through study in the West Bank or 
abroad; researchers and institutions need to interact. Among the 
consequences, the Institute of Women’s Studies also lost some 
of its outstanding graduate students and the students lost their 
opportunity to pursue the only advanced degree in gender and 
development in Palestine. 
In the aftermath of Israel’s war on Gaza, the losses for higher 
education are of a much greater magnitude, including the 
physical destruction of Gazan educational institutions. Among 
the multiple war crimes committed by Israeli forces during their 
brutal war was the bombing of two main buildings of the Islamic 
University of Gaza, containing 74 science and engineering labs. 
Total damage to post-secondary institutions is estimated at 
about 21 million dollars and fourteen of 15 higher education 
institutions in Gaza have been damaged. At present, university 
officials report many students unable to register for the new 
semester due to lack of funds, trauma and displacement. And a 
full generation of students in Gaza have been denied the ability 
to use their hard-won scholarships to study abroad. The Review 
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of Women’s Studies urges its readers to work for the right for education of Gazans 
and an end to the Israeli occupation’s punitive and illegal siege.
This issue of the Review has a special focus on Gaza in its English section, 
including the war diary of Majeda Al Saqqa, a colleague living and working in 
Khan Yunis, Gaza, researchers Aetimad Mohanna and Elana Qleibo’s insights 
into the effects of the siege on Gazan women and girls, and an excerpt from 
Rema Hammami’s doctoral thesis which examines how women refugees in 
Gaza contributed to family survival in the wake of the 1948 nakba. We also 
welcome into our pages Nadine Naber, whose analysis of the intersectionality 
of gender, race and class oppression of Arab and Muslim Americans in the wake 
of 2001 broadens our own horizons both theoretically and empirically. Eileen 
Kuttab’s analysis placing the dilemmas facing the Palestinian women’s movement 
within the global dynamics of empire, and Lena Miari’s thoughtful review of an 
important new book by Saba Mahmoud also expands our understanding of the 
complex times in which we live.
In the Arabic section, we are pleased to feature Lila Abu Lughod’s incisive 
analysis of the 2005 Arab Human Development Report: Towards the Rise of Women 
in the Arab World, with responses by the co-editor of the Report, Islah Jad, as well 
as Amira Silmi and Eileen Kuttab. The section also includes a contribution one of 
the the Institute’s master’s students, Ziad Yaish, who discusses the contradictions 
resulting from having a dual legal system in Arabic societies including Palestine by 
comparing the newly proposed Palestinian personal status law to the Convention 
for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Abla Abu 
Ilbeh, a co-researcher in a project on the Palestinian women’s movement carried 
out by the Institute of Women’s Studies, contributes an article on the changes that 
took place in the Palestinian women’s movement in the Arab countries hosting 
the Palestinian refugees after the signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993 and the 
return of the Palestinian leadership to the occupied territories in 1994. 
Mahmud Yazbek, from Haifa University, contributes an article on strategies 
used by minor wives to rid themselves from an undesired marriage. Yazbek’s 
article gives interesting insights on contradictions of modernity in the Palestinian 
society by showing how modernity put an end to minor marriages while at the 
same time imposing restrictions on women’s sexuality. 
The Institute of Women’s Studies mourns the loss of Maha Nassar, a graduate 
of the Institute’s master’s program and an activist and leader whose record in 
promoting both women’s and national rights is memorialized in a contribution 
to this issue by Rula Abu Dahu. Maha’s courage in facing her illness matched 
her courage in the rest of her life and work, whether during imprisonment by 
the Israeli occupation or in her untiring mobilization for national and women’s 
liberation. 
The Editors
April 2009
ARTICLES
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FOCUS ON GAZA
War Diary from Khan Younis:  
“My life is not my life”
Majeda Al Saqqa
Many of us in the West Bank spent the terrible days of the war 
on Gaza seeking (and fearing) news, whether from television, 
the internet, friends and strangers. When we opened up the 
email and saw a heading “snippets from Khan Yunis from 
Majeda,” a click brought the distinctive voice of Majeda Al 
Saqqa, long-time activist, a lover of her hometown Khan Yunis 
and a community worker on its behalf. Majeda is a strategist, 
always seeking to expand the horizons of Palestinian activism, in 
particular women’s participation and women’s health and well-
being. As her diary shows, she is also a devoted daughter – and 
an even more devoted aunt to her young nephews and niece. Her 
diary, written while the war was waged around her, is excerpted 
here with Majeda’s kind permission. Readers around the world 
have responded to excerpts from her diary published in numerous 
languages and a variety of media. The diary offers a window 
into the world of war as experienced by Gazan women and their 
families – the shrinkage of life into domestic space, the endless 
strategizing to protect children physically and psychologically, the 
perils and joys of daily survival. Besieged in her home, Majeda 
reaches out to find out the welfare of friends and relatives in 
all of Gaza’s danger zones; she observes herself changing and 
struggling, despondent and resilient, afraid and conquering 
fear, if even for a moment when a silent mobile rings. When we 
asked Majeda if she would write a postscript, she only said: “Just 
remember to say I am from Khan Younis.”
Majeda Al Saqqa is director of public relations and deputy general 
director for Khan Yunis’s Culture and Free Thought Association. She 
has a master’s degree in anthropology of media from the School of 
Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). 
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27 December, 2008
I had a strong feeling that the Israelis 
would attack over the Christmas 
holidays. I know deep in my heart 
that the neither EU governments 
nor the USA will care much about 
responding. But I also know that the 
Israelis will calculate to commit their 
massacres when they have more time.
But I didn’t imagine for a second it 
would be like this. At around 11 or 
11:30 am, I felt like an earthquake hit 
Khan Younis with sounds I’d never, 
ever heard before — not even when 
the Israeli occupation forces used 
sonic booms a few years ago. 
The first thing that came to my heart 
was my mother, sisters and the kids 
at school and kindergarten. I rushed 
down the steps, faster than the sounds 
I was hearing. Looked into my sister’s 
eyes, looked into my mother’s eyes 
and, in no time, I ran towards the 
steps into the garden to go get the 
kids from kindergarten and school… 
The kids were scared and talking 
about the huge sound which they 
didn’t understand. Wael, my 4-year-
old nephew didn’t understand a thing 
— he didn’t even know that Israel 
exists.
Now he knows. All of them do.
The whole family didn’t know what to 
do, so we all gathered in the garden. 
Last time the Israelis attacked, our 
windows crashed in over our heads 
and some doors were broken. This 
time the shelling is stronger, so the 
best solution seems to be, to stay out 
in the open. 
All of that and the noise of the 
bombing continues, there’s smoke 
around us everywhere and the smell of 
shelling is back to pollute our life one 
more time.
I was trying for over an hour to 
call my brother and his family in 
Gaza city to know that he was safe. 
Landline and mobile lines were out 
of service! After an hour we managed 
to get hold of one of them — my 
nephew Azzam. He tells me that he’s 
safe at one of the shelters in the UN 
compound in Gaza. It’s the first time I 
hear that shelters even exist in Gaza!
Later, we discovered that the bombing 
happened at the same time in all of 
Gaza Strip. How lucky my family and 
I are because we are not among the 
scores of people killed in the first 5 
minutes of the attack! We are lucky, 
we really are!!! 
For the past 20 days we haven’t had 
cooking gas. Last month my cousin 
gave us his extra 6 kg to use. This 
morning, on Black Saturday, the 27th 
of December, 2008, we managed to 
get some cooking gas from the black 
market which I have been trying to 
avoid all my life. At 5 pm I felt it was 
safe to take the cooking gas cylinder 
to my cousin’s house because the 
shelling had stopped. The house is 
only 5 minutes away from us by car. 
The kids insisted to come and they 
started to cry, so I took them with me. 
We drove in a loop around the house 
and entered the street from behind. 
But then I remembered that there was 
a police station there, so I thought 
it’s better to take the other road. I 
reversed and took the other street to 
find in front of us an Israeli warplane 
shelling a car. 
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The kids see the flames and hear the 
sound. They’re so scared. I tell them 
this is fireworks for the New Year. 
We leave the fireworks behind and 
come home. My mother tells us 
that the Israelis have just shelled 
Asda’a Media City, at the edge of 
Khan Younis. Arslan, my 5-year-old 
nephew, is furious. Arslan, like all 
other kids, likes this place because 
it has fish, a small zoo, a small 
playground and a restaurant. He 
cries and cries. I cannot promise him 
anything: “I’m sure we’ll find another 
place that is more beautiful…“
All night I couldn’t sleep, hearing the 
shelling, calling friends and family 
to make sure they were ok, listening 
to the radio because there was no 
electricity to watch TV, and cursing 
myself for being so stupid as to take 
the kids out of the house!!! Isn’t it wise 
to take kids out?... Of course, it is... 
But not in Gaza. 
28 December, 2008
In the morning, Wael wakes up and 
comes to me to show me his finger 
which is swollen: “Look, this is from 
the shelling and air strike!”
“When?” I ask.
“Last night when I was sleeping, they 
hit me.” 
“You lie,” I say.
He smiles and says: “You lie too...”!!! 
31 December, 2008 
Last night I called my friend Wafa, 
who is living in Gaza City, in Tel Al-
Hawa neighborhood, to check on her. 
She is fine and they are a lucky family, 
as she said. Because on Saturday 
when the first bombing of Gaza Strip 
started, she had all her doors and 
windows open since she was about to 
clean and rearrange her apartment. 
None of her windows or doors are 
broken, unlike all her neighbors, 
who are now seeking her apartment’s 
refuge on the second floor. 
“Mira, my daughter, is the one 
who is scared,” Wafa told me. “You 
remember her, right?”
“I thought if I take her out to see 
the reality of Gaza she might be less 
scared because we’re all living the 
same situation and I’m sure we’re 
better off than others. So I took her 
for a walk around the neighborhood. 
I wish I hadn’t!” 
“When I saw what I saw, I got scared 
myself,” Wafa explained. “I wanted 
to blindfold her eyes and run back 
home. I cursed myself for taking her 
out of the apartment. But I’d never 
imagined Gaza could become a ghost 
city in less than a day! If you see our 
neighborhood you will not recognize 
it.”
Wafa added with a hysterical note: 
“You know, Majeda, we are all fine. 
Really. Our only problem is that we 
don’t get any electricity since the 
bombings on the first day. Since then 
I make the bread dough and send it to 
my neighbor in the building nearby to 
have it baked. 
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“To be honest, the bread, the cold, 
buildings and all of that are not the 
problem for us today,” Wafa told me. 
“Our real problem is that we have this 
rocket which didn’t explode in front 
of the building.” 
“What rocket?” 
“The F16 rocket. We called several 
people but no one can do anything 
about it, 
“You mean it’s still in front of the 
building?!” 
‘No, not right in front now. The Civil 
Defense came and tied a rope around 
it and moved it up toward the road.” 
“They put some sand over it so no 
kids or others would get hurt.” 
2 January, 2009
Wael woke up really angry with 
me this morning. He came to me 
frowning and, as he hugged me, he 
said: “I don’t want to give you a hug 
or kiss you today.” 
I ask why. 
“You promised us a Christmas tree 
and you didn’t get one. You promised 
to take me to the beach when it rains 
and you didn’t. You promised we 
would watch the birds in the sky and 
now you won’t even allow us to move 
from the living room and play in the 
garden.” 
Wael loves to watch birds. For the last 
six days, every day he looks up at the 
sky and wonders why the birds take 
so long to go to their nests Yesterday 
Wael was watching his birds and all 
of a sudden an F16 started roaming 
about, occupying the sky. The birds 
flew from right to left and then back 
again — every time they found a safe 
area in the sky an airplane would drop 
another shell and the birds would flee 
to the other side. In the beginning, 
Wael was laughing and he called all 
his brothers to watch how the birds 
were dislocated. But today Wael is 
really angry; he feels that the birds are 
not safe. 
Wael tells me: “Last night when I 
went to sleep the airplane hit my 
finger again. I know you don’t believe 
me, but it fell down and set fire to our 
garden. I could smell the fire. 
“What did you do?”
“I was looking for my airplane to 
go up and take all the birds to their 
mother because they were calling me 
to help them.”
 
He asks: “What is war?” 
“War is what we are living now. Like 
what you saw in your dream.” 
“And why would any one make this 
war?”
I think that he’s got the idea and then 
he continues: “Why would anyone 
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not want the birds to go back to their 
nests?”
4 January, 2009
Yesterday was the most awful day 
we ever lived, I think. My mother 
said even the 1967 War was not this 
bad. No electricity, very little water, 
freezing cold and most horrific was 
the cold accompanied by the live war 
orchestra.
Tanks bombing from the ground 
incursion, F16s bombing, the drone 
which keeps going around in circles 
all day and night non-stop, making 
this annoying sound as if there is a 
bee just at the edge of your ear. And 
added to all of this, the sound of 
shelling from the sea.
War melody, is what I want to call it.
I ask Wael to come inside because it’s 
freezing cold outside. His birds are no 
longer in the sky. “Come let’s play the 
Alaska game!”
“What is Alaska?”
“It’s a new game we’ll all play with 
grandmother. Each of us has her/his 
own blanket to cover all of the body 
from head to toe.” 
I don’t know if we were trying to 
warm ourselves or trying to hide from 
all the bombing... Whatever it was, 
it felt better under the blankets since 
there was no electricity and no birds 
in the sky comforting us.
“Ok, Wael, you are the head of the 
state of Alaska, and we are the people 
of Alaska. What do you order us to 
do?” I started the game...
 
“I order you to go to the shop and 
buy me an airplane, a cage and seeds,” 
he said, sucking on his thumb.
 
“Why?” I ask. “You need to explain 
to me.”
“I want to fly up, up, up — till I 
reach God! 
I will bring all my birds,
and put them in a cage.
I’ll fly again, 
and I’ll catch the pilot. 
I will bring him here
and give him the seeds to feed the 
birds.”
...And I thought the Alaska game 
could bring some kind of creative 
ideas to bring warmth to our 
bodies and some life under this 
bombardment. 
Unfortunately, it wasn’t a very smart 
idea. So I just obeyed my mother’s 
order: we all got closer to each other 
and created a net of hugs that really 
brought warmth to our life and a little 
bit of security. 
5 January, 2008
Just before going to bed Wael says: 
“Actually, I like war.”
I ask why.
“Because I don’t have to wash my 
face and hands. I don’t have to wash 
my hands and face in this cold. And 
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I don’t have to go to kindergarten in 
the morning.”
 
“But you won’t be able to count 
the bombs... if you don’t go to 
kindergarten, because you’ll only be 
able to count until 50.”
“I don’t like to count bombs anyway,” 
he answers and goes up the steps. 
I feel how stupid I am to make this 
little boy count bombs. I’m so angry 
with myself.
7 January, 2009
Like a can of sardines, we’re all 
gathered in one room. 
It’s too unsafe for my brother and 
family to sleep upstairs. 
The house-quaking experience is too 
scary. 
Wael and I share a small narrow 
mattress on the floor. 
We both start looking at photos 
on my mobile, trying to ignore the 
live war orchestra outside. Within 
minutes, Wael is asleep, holding the 
mobile in one hand and his thumb in 
his mouth.
He looks like an angel with his eyes 
half open – as if he doesn’t want to 
miss a moment of pleasure — he 
loves mobiles. I can’t afford to let him 
take photos all day like he demands 
because I have to save the battery.
 
At 5 am I’m fast asleep. 
Wael starts drawing on my face with 
his little fingers. 
He softly touches my forehead, my 
mouth. 
Then he starts whispering in my ear. 
“I’m talking softly in your ear because 
I don’t want to wake you up,” he says. 
“What did you say? I didn’t hear you.” 
“The war is over and today we must 
go out,” he whispers. 
“Ok,” I say and fall back to sleep. 
“Wael, I want to sleep.”
“The war is over.” 
“No, the war is not over.” 
Wael leaves me no choice but to wake 
up. 
He starts waking everyone else up 
too and by 5:30 the whole house is in 
action
“Let’s go now.” 
“No,” I said “the war is not over.”
“We won’t buy anything, just go in a 
loop around the house.” he said
“Wael, believe me it’s too dangerous 
to go out of the house. Just go and 
play.”
He’s mad at me again. He goes to the 
garden and chooses to play exactly in 
the area I asked him and all the kids 
not to play in. It’s just a few minutes 
before there’s supposed to be a three-
hour lull in the bombings – Israel has 
announced it will allow ‘safe passage’ 
for humanitarian assistance. But I 
can’t believe it:
“Wael, I asked you not to play there.” 
“I asked you to take me out,” he 
retorts. 
“But it’s dangerous!” I scream. 
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He ignores me and heads further 
toward where I don’t want him to be. 
I go inside the house for a second. 
Wael runs after me. 
All of a sudden, there’s a huge 
explosion. 
Black airplanes are everywhere. 
They cover the sky. 
More than one. 
More than two. 
More than three.
At least half a dozen at once.
A terrifying sound. 
Everywhere in the neighborhood, 
children start crying.
Wael’s clutching on to my pants, his 
thumb in his mouth.
I pick him up and throw him at his 
mother. 
“I don’t want to go out today,” Wael 
announces.
9 January, 2009
Today my mother brought out the 
old style kerosene lamp she inherited 
from her mother. It had long ago 
become part of the decor in our guest 
sitting room where she keeps all her 
fancy and kitsch souvenirs. She filled 
it up with kerosene despite the fact 
that half of the family has allergies to 
kerosene. 
The lamp makes a nice atmosphere 
during the quiet moments early this 
evening! 
The full moon coming in from the 
opened windows and doors adds more 
light to the room. It feels warmer 
today. Oddly, all of us, sitting there 
in the living room are talking softly, 
as if we’re hiding our voices from 
something. Someone I don’t know.
My brother Nael, my sister Zeinat 
and my nephew Hitham start playing 
cards. 
The game sounds too serious because 
everyone’s trying to suppress their 
anxiety.
“I think one of the stitches in my 
eye is coming out,” Zeinat says. “My 
doctor is in Gaza, the road to Gaza 
is cut, and the hospitals are only 
taking emergencies and this is not an 
emergency! And your mother’s old 
lamp is adding to my problem,” she 
adds looking at my mother, who is 
not impressed with this comment.
 
Hitham looks at me and says, “Can’t 
you do it?”
“What?”
“Can’t you remove the stitch?”
“Me?”
“Yes, you.”
But before he finishes, the house starts 
shaking. 
Left and right.
Endless horrific sound.
Winds sweep in from the windows.
Doors slamming.
And everywhere across the 
neighborhood, children are crying. 
A huge glare lights up the entire city 
of Khan Younis. 
Our eyes stare at the door.
We’re trying to recall what we 
memorized yesterday.
About what to do when an F16 hits 
your area. 
But is it an F16? Because if its tanks 
shelling, then the instructions are 
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different...
A few seconds pass. 
Obviously, we are bad students 
because our only reaction is silence. 
We stare wide-eyed at the door.
And wait...
Can we call three seconds “waiting”?
I guess in Gaza you can.
Three seconds in Gaza can actually 
change your future. 
10 January, 2009
Logic is my key for today.
I want to apologize to all the 
musicians in the world for calling the 
sounds of bombing an orchestra. 
After a horrific night of tank 
shelling, bombardment by F16s, 
maybe an Apache too, the drone 
and, most scary of all, the smell of 
phosphorus gas reaching the edge of 
our neighborhood, today, I want to 
apologize to all musicians. 
No, war sounds are far more 
frightening and ugly. 
Today I will not joke.
I will think logic and talk logic.
Not enough food at home. 
Children frustrated, wanting out of 
this prison.
It’s not going to end today.
It might last for much longer. 
Demands are increasing at all levels 
and from every side. 
So, best is to act. 
No safe place in Gaza Strip. 
If my own bed is not safe,
then the market is not safe. 
But it might be safer than, or at least 
as safe as my bed could be.... 
So, I’m up early.
I call the children: “Come, we’ll all go 
to the vegetable market.” 
“Is the war over?” screams Arslan, my 
5-year-old nephew happily.
“No, but there will be a ceasefire, a 
‘safe corridor’ from 1 to 3 pm,” I tell 
him. 
“Is it 1 pm?” Arslan asks.
“What’s a ceasefire?” Wael asks my 
sister at the same time.
“Is a safe corridor like the one we use 
next to our bathroom?” 
For me it seems safer to get out before 
the ceasefire because it doesn’t seem 
that there really is one, or at least that 
it’s observed....
I catch Arslan’s eye: “Looks like there’s 
movement in the streets, so we’ll try 
to go now.” 
I haven’t seen the children so happy. 
They don’t wait for me to get the 
car out from the garage. Like birds 
escaping the cage, they all start 
singing and dancing on the door step 
of our house.
I drive and decide that I will only 
look in the car mirror straight in front 
of me. 
I don’t want to see anything around 
me. 
I love Khan Younis. 
I can’t do anything for Khan Younis 
today but wait patiently and survive, 
so tomorrow we all can do something. 
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Halfway to the market, we’re the only 
car in the street.
Arslan is looking out on the other side 
of the road. He screams: “Hey look, 
our kindergarten! They destroyed the 
building near our garden!” 
Majed, my 6-year-old nephew, asks 
me “Who did this?” 
I answer, “The airplane.” 
“I know, but who is in the airplane?”
Majed repeats his question
“Who did this destruction?”
I look at him and say: “The Israelis. 
But don’t ask me who they are now 
because if you look just in front of 
you, you’ll see where we’ll buy our 
stuff.”
There was a huge truck distributing 
flour to people. 
We sat and waited until some families 
got their quota and then they sat in 
the sun and started selling half of 
what they’d received. 
An old woman was sitting covering 
her face. 
I went to her and asked if I could buy 
from her.
“Yes, please, I have to get back 
quickly. If my sons know I am here, 
they’ll be upset with me. I came 
because we have nothing left at home. 
And we have twelve children at home 
who need to eat three times a day.” 
I asked her why she is selling the flour 
in this case. 
“Because we got two bags from 
UNRWA, we’ll use one and with the 
money of the other one we’ll buy 
vegetables.” 
“Ok, then how much is this?” 
“NIS180.”
“Why? It was 90, I say.
“Everyone in the market is selling at 
this price.” 
“Ok then, I will take it.” 
Some young men come and help me 
put it in the trunk.
When I switch the car on, Dima asks: 
“Why did you buy that sack of flour? 
It’s got ‘Not for Sale’ written on it” 
I look at her jokingly: “I bought it, 
I will not sell it, because it is not for 
sale.”
And we drive back, with my eyes 
staring only straight ahead. 
I hear Wael, Arslan, Dima and 
Majed playing their new game “I see 
something different.” 
I’m not ready to look.
Shelling starts in Khan Younis. 
Strikes somewhere not far, but far.
I drive quickly, passing down the 
main market road – a road I’ve not 
been able to drive down for the past 
20 years because it’s always so packed 
full of people and stands. 
Today I can drive as fast as I want; it’s 
totally empty.
We reach home and everyone’s happy.
The phone rings.
Wael runs to answer.
“Hello. Who is it?” 
A few more seconds of silence.
“But we need sugar.
“And I want a car and an airplane 
with a remote control.”
 
I run to pick up the second phone. 
This boy is out of control. He has to 
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stop asking my friends to buy him 
things every time they call: 
“Hello?...”
It’s a recorded message from the Israeli 
military.
The message repeats: 
“If you have guns at home you should 
get rid of them. 
“If you are hiding any of the 
militias, report them at the following 
number... 
“If you have information you want to 
share, call the following number…” 
Precisely at 1pm, the cease fire starts. 
I was right in my calculation and 
logic. 
The military planes are back in the 
sky, performing their daily shock and 
awe show, complete with the sound 
and motion. The chorus of kids crying 
their hearts out starts up across the 
neighborhood again.
I secretly congratulate myself — going 
to the market before the ceasefire was 
a wise choice. But now it’s time to go 
comfort and hug the kids.
11 January, 2008
“What’s wrong with your rooster?” 
my friend shouts down the phone 
line. 
“Its 9 pm and he’s crowing as if it’s 
dawn!”
“Suffering jetlag,” I explain.
“They didn’t sleep all night because of 
the explosions.
“They’re hungry because there’s no 
feed for them in the market.
“And an Apache just lit up the whole 
Khan Younis skyline with their flares. 
“They think it’s the morning. 
“But don’t worry, they’ll go back to 
sleep,” I assure her.
13 January, 2009 
Majed and I are playing the telephone 
game, 
He takes one telephone handset and I 
take the other.
We change roles all the time. 
Majed always wants to take the role of 
my friend Rana.
Maybe because we talk on the phone 
endlessly.
She is in Jerusalem.
And I am in Khan Younis. 
I go to the kitchen for a second.
I hear Majed tell Rana: “When 
this shooting ends, I will not go to 
school.” 
Majed has refused to use the word 
“war” since the beginning.
He continues, “They hit the schools 
and they kill children.”
I am shocked.
All my prevention efforts, all my 
efforts to protect him just blown to 
bits. 
The kids don’t watch the news AT 
ALL.
We don’t talk about war in front of 
them AT ALL.
We try to play with them all the 
games that they love.
I go to Majed, I hug him.
“Not your school and not you.
They can’t, because I’m here to protect 
you.
They will never touch you.”
Still hugging him, he tells me that 
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he had a dream about his school 
being burned down. And his teacher 
becoming two teachers — one for 
math and one for English.
He tells me that he lost his bag and 
his pencil in his dream.
I have lost my mind.
I hold his face in my two hands: 
“Listen, your school is fine and will be 
fine. 
You will finish your exams and we will 
go to the sea and we will play.”
I want him to believe me this time. I 
don’t want him to have any doubt.
This is why I said the sea this time...
Because they will never be able to 
destroy the sea of Gaza. 
14 January, 2009
I’m in shock. 
My life is not my life. 
Only now ... 
after 16 days of war on Gaza I 
recognize that I am living someone 
else’s life
I no more have the routine I am used 
to living.
Even if I didn’t like it.
And I was unsatisfied with it. 
Even if I love change and I run after it 
What I’m living now, what I am today 
is panic.
Waking up too early. 
Exhausted, unable to open my eyes, a 
constant headache, allergies from the 
kerosene lamp. 
The feeling of dislocation, the feeling 
of strangeness. 
I’m dizzy.
Tired and confused. 
Out of control. 
Before coffee, trying to get hold of 
Murad, my colleague who’s already 
moved with his wife, children and 
parents to three different houses and 
might move to the fourth. 
Seeking safety and life. 
“Hello, Murad, are you Ok? How is 
the house? Did you sleep well? Where 
are they? In your neighborhood,” 
I respond without waiting for his 
answer.
Who cares. I just want to know he’s 
alive 
15 January, 2009
Every thing is always changing about 
this war. But there is one constant: it 
gets worse everyday.
Today is really the worst day for us. 
I need to escape from my mother as I 
can’t hide my anxiety any more.
I decide to escape in the shower 
because we have electricity and the 
sun will help the water gets warmer.
I jump into the shower and turn on 
the hot water. Mmmmmm, how nice 
and warm. It’s really relaxing. I close 
my eyes, enjoying the nice hot water 
spraying over my body. 
Abruptly, the electricity goes off.
The cold water sears through my 
protesting body like an electric shock.
All the neighbors hear is my 
screaming and cursing. 
The cold water hurts in this cold 
temperature.
I jump out of the shower and into all 
the clothes I can find.
Summer clothes, winter clothes, my 
sister’s clothes and sit as close as I can 
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to my mother, trying to absorb her 
warmth. 
I’m still shivering.
“You don’t listen, you just want to do 
it your way. Why didn’t you heat the 
water on the kerosene stove and take a 
bath, like I do!” 
“Mother, I don’t like it, the kerosene 
gives me allergies and a headache and 
I feel I need a shower after that kind 
of bath. On top of that I would have 
to wait two hours for the process to 
end, before I even start my bath.”
She adds: “Clothes won’t warm you up. 
Eat something or move or go sit in 
the sun.” 
I take my small transistor radio and 
go to sit in the sun with my cousins in 
the garden. 
Each one is holding a radio in his 
hand, supporting it with the shoulder, 
clamping it near his ear and listening 
softly. 
I switch on my radio to 106 FM and 
hear the guy saying: “106 FM from 
you and for you, 24 hours a day, with 
the action, minute by minute.” The 
breaking news signal – so well-known 
in Gaza — interrupts the ad.
The reporter, his voice shaking, 
announces: “The Israeli tanks are 
shelling the Red Crescent Hospital 
in Gaza, at this very moment, with 
phosphoric bombs.” 
I keep dialing all the mobile numbers 
of relatives and friends in Gaza city. 
No coverage.
The network’s dead.
I dial the landline.
Maha picks up the phone:
“How is it in Khan Younis?”
“Nothing here. Only F16s and the 
sound of tanks coming from far away.”
We’re used to it by now.
How is it in your area?”
“What’s the news? What do you hear 
about us?” she asks me, her voice 
barely coming out of her throat. 
“We have no electricity. We hear the 
bombs. But we don’t see anything 
from the windows but smoke. What 
do you hear about us? ”
“Nothing,” I reply. “I want you to tell 
me.”
“A missile hit our neighbor’s villa by 
mistake.”
Why by mistake, I ask myself. How 
does she know? Why did she decide 
that it was hit by mistake?
So I ask, “How?”
“You know the villa in front of 
the building, in front of the Gaza 
International Hotel? She keeps going 
on and on, giving me details about 
exactly where exactly the villa is — as 
if she’s trying to blindfold me and 
take me in circles so I feel like it’s 
really far away.
I interrupt: “You mean the one just in 
front of you?”
“Yes, but not exactly in front.” 
The villa is only a few dozen meters 
away from them. With no electricity, 
no batteries left, no mobiles and the 
land line connection barely operating, 
they’re really isolated.
She keeps asking me what I know 
about them from the news, about 
their street, about the neighborhood. 
“Where are they — exactly?” 
I feel like telling her” “Don’t worry, 
Maha, you’re fine, you’ve not been hit 
yet!!!!!
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I hang up with her and call my friend 
Wafa. 
It’s the shortest conversation but it 
sums up this war on Gaza. 
My first stupid sentence: “I hope I 
didn’t wake you up.”
Wafa, as usual, says it all:
“The tanks are downstairs, at our 
doorstep, we are five, six, maybe seven 
families now in the stair well of the 
building, we can’t get inside, we can’t 
close or open the windows because of 
the smoke, the smell of burning. We 
hear — right now – our neighbors 
calling for help. The tank downstairs 
is hitting Gaza center, the tank in 
front of the Red Crescent is pointed 
at us, I brought the phone next to 
me on the steps in case someone 
calls. We’re waiting to go to school, 
UNRWA, any place that is safer, but 
we can’t – they’re everywhere and I 
have to hang up now.”
We’re still in this circle around the 
phone, when I get the weirdest phone 
call — from an Italian. A woman by 
the name of ...Cara, maybe?
The voice isn’t clear at all.
After several tries she manages to get 
through.
I can hardly understand her.
“I heard you’re working with the 
Italian organisation AIDOS... That 
you have a clinic for women... And 
a gynecologist. My sister-in-law is in 
Shifa Hospital... She’s pregnant... She 
needs a gynecologist... Majeda, how 
can you help me?”
“How can I help... Cara?” 
Hospitals are in a state of emergency. 
Patients are sharing beds and sleeping 
on the floors in the corridors. Some 
doctors, nurses and ambulance drivers 
haven’t slept for the past 20 days. 
I’m in Khan Younis. How can I help 
this Italian while there is war raging 
through the streets of Gaza. Gaza city 
is 30 km away from me. Roads are 
cut. The road is controlled by high 
technology murdering machines. They 
work like an Atari Game: press here to 
kill a Gazan. 
Left arrow: burn the house down.
Haircross on the moving target : miss 
the target, hit the villa. Of course, by 
mistake. Madness.
I remember a cousin whose house is 
not far from Shifa Hospital. He’s a 
gynecologist. I give her the number 
and tell her to call him. 
I hope they’ll have a baby girl.
Who can look after her parents in the 
future. 
Like all my girlfriends are doing now 
with their parents. 
16 January, 2009 
I didn’t want my calls to be an extra 
burden to Wafa and her family.. 
So I stopped calling them.
And started following their news from 
two radios.
I put one ear phone on the left and 
the other on the right
Two FM channels, broadcasting 
locally not far from the scene.
One of the reporters is unable to 
breath.
The other is comforting.
As if they are listening to each other, 
the two reporters were switching roles.
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One is worried, the other is comfort-
ing.
One is terrified, the other is in 
control.
The news is getting worse.
The battery is dead.
A forwarded text message from Wafa: 
“We are safe in the UNRWA school 
in Sheja’iya.” 
I am back to dialing her mobile like 
crazy. 
The recorded message: “out of 
coverage area” is shelling my ear. 
Wafa’s taken refuge at an UNRWA 
school.
With her teenager girls.
What will her young teenager girls 
do? 
What if one of them gets her period?
What if they are sick ?
What if the Israeli hit this particular 
school?
What if ...
It is too cold.
Wafa and her family and thousands of 
displaced children, women and men 
at UNRWA schools... all of them are 
out of coverage.
The only thing that’s really covering 
them today is WAR. 
Life in Gaza, today: what does it 
mean?
 
Twenty days have passed with me and 
war.
The F16 is in the sky. Not one and 
not two. I don’t know how many.
I can’t count, its already 1 am and we 
have electricity; I need to finish some 
work on the computer.
I decide to work upstairs.
I miss my time and space.
The sound of the F16s is scaring me.
It goes from my toe to my knee, 
from my stomach to my chest, 
from my heart to my throat.
I feel suffocated.
Suspense .. it fades in and out 
I feel it inside my body.
My head is full of images. 
Suspense. Suspense. Suspense. 
Finally it hits.
Fade out .. it returns to my toes, my 
knees, up to my head.
I am full of F16s.
Hitting again.
This time I feel it inside me.
FM radios are not functioning.
Either because their broadcasting 
station has been hit or because they 
have no fuel to run the generator or 
because they collapsed like most of 
the buildings.
They’ve been working 24 hours non-
stop.
Giving people instructions on how to 
save their lives.
Their children’s lives.
They express themselves very well.
They are full of love, care, 
commitment. 
They left their families and houses 
to be with their people at the time 
they are needed, like so many other 
Gazans.
They are working in the most 
dangerous locations and all of them 
are targeted.
They don’t have to stand up like a 
stewardess in the airplane corridor and 
stiffly act out the safety instructions.
They just need to speak out for me 
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and for thousands to give us comfort.
The F16 is hitting again and again .. 
I am terrified by the last hit; it’s 
rocking the house.
After 20 days of war on Gaza, I’m still 
terrified by the F16.
But more so from the phosphorous 
bombs being dropped on Khan Younis. 
17 January, 2009
After more than 48 hours and more 
than 48 thousand tries, finally, 
early this morning, Wafa’s mobile is 
ringing. 
Its 7 am they must be sleeping, I just 
wanted to get a sign of life from them.
I got it, they must be sleeping, I press 
the off button. It rang only once.
More than enough for me.
Because it’s hard to sleep in Gaza, I 
decided to press the off button.
Maybe they haven’t slept for the 
last 48 hours and they’ve only now 
managed to sleep.
I’m more than happy.
I inform my mother that Wafa is 
alive.
My mother asks millions of questions, 
I have not even one answer.
It was only a ringing tone.
A ringing tone means my friend 
Wafa’s life to me.
The three hour humanitarian “lull” 
just started.
I dial Wafa’s number.
Her daughter sounds fresh, full of 
energy, full of life.
Where did she get all this energy 
from?
I’ve been thinking of her non-stop 
for 48 hours wondering how she’ll 
manage at the UNRWA school. 
‘”We’re all ok,... in Sheja’iya... we’re 
with my father’s relatives, sheltering at 
this house, it is safer than our flat.”
No safe place in Gaza.
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FOCUS ON GAZA
Negotiating Survival: The Impact of Israeli 
Mobility Restrictions on Women in Gaza
Aitemad Muhanna & Elena Qleibo
In April and May 2008, Gaza researchers Aitemad Muhanna 
and Elena Qleibo conducted extensive focus groups and in-depth 
interviews with Gaza housewives, young people, schoolteachers 
and women in micro-credit program as part of a project of the 
Institute of Women’s Studies examining impacts of Israeli mobility 
restrictions on women’s economic and social participation, and 
on gender relations, in Palestine1. Respondents were from four 
communities in diverse locations in the Gaza Strip: in the north, 
Beit Hanoun; in Gaza city, the al Zaytoun neighbourhood; 
in Middle Gaza, al Maghazi refugee camp and in the south, 
Al Seyamat neighbourhood in Rafah. Mohanna and Qleibo’s 
report offered rich insights and nuanced and innovative analysis 
into how Gazan women and men, as well as male and female 
youth, negotiate individual and family survival in immensely 
difficult conditions, an analysis that is even more relevant today 
in the wake of Israel’s war on Gaza. For reasons of length, we 
can offer Review readers only an excerpt of the report, including 
the context, the analysis of focus groups with housewives and a 
summary of the main findings. 
Aitemad Muhanna is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Swansea. 
Elena Qleibo is a Program Officer for Oxfam-GB based in Gaza.
Context: Siege and the De-Development of Gaza
All Gazans have been affected in different ways and degrees by Israel’s prolonged 
siege and closure. The Israeli restrictions on mobility for people and goods in and 
out of Gaza have obviously distorted class and social divisions that had historically 
constituted Gaza’s economy, with its almost complete reliance on the Israeli 
1 The Institute produced a background report on the request, and supported by, the World Bank 
entitled, “The impact of Israeli mobility restrictions and violence on gender relations in Palestinian 
society, 2000-2007.”
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market. The vast majority of the Gaza labour force used to be engaged in wage 
labour in Israel before Israel enforced its policy of prevention of Gaza labourers 
to reach their work since the mid-1990s and finally the almost complete border 
closure of today.
Before the mid-1990s, wage labourers in Israel, subcontractors and traders 
with Israeli companies used to have a better-off standard of living, while local 
public and private sectors’ employees and labourers were perceived as low income 
earners and thus worse off. The dramatic deterioration of Gaza’s economy since 
the closure has led to a striking reversal: public employees with the government 
and NGOs, regardless of the amount of income they earn, but because of the 
regularity of the income, became the better off sector of the population in 
relation to livelihood security. Most skilled and semiskilled labourers in Israel 
became permanently unemployed and after the prolonged period of closure they 
have used up all their savings. Some became dependent on their close relatives 
who are income earners, particularly brothers. Most wage labourers in Israel had 
relatively low levels of education; they acquired skills in their workplace that do 
not necessarily mesh with the needs and practices of Gaza’s traditional economy.
Former workers in Israel living in or outside refugee camps have lost all 
sources of livelihood. With no remaining savings, they spend most of their time 
doing nothing, except temporary low-income jobs offered to them by better 
off neighbours or by the job creation programs supported by the international 
community. Households have become increasingly reliant on humanitarian aid 
by UNRWA, WFP and other charitable associations. The situation of rural men 
is slightly different since many of them have a small plot of land around their 
homes where they can plant and also raise poultry or livestock. Many rural men 
asserted that their home based agricultural production does not really rescue their 
families from the financial crisis, but it helps them to provide food and to reduce 
debt. Men who own medium to large sizes plots have also been seriously affected 
by the continuous military incursions and land devastation. They tried to utilize 
their lands during the first few years of the Intifada, but they later stopped working 
them because of the Israeli’s continuous incursions and destruction of their lands. 
Many are now unable to reach their lands due to Israeli military threat (especially 
if lands are near the extensive “buffer zones”). 
Men in rural communities have been forced to enter the domain of women 
in agriculture by supporting or/ and sharing agricultural work with their wives 
or mothers during the seasonal agriculture production in the small yards around 
the homes. Few rural men contribute in selling the agricultural products in the 
local market, but the majority asserted that the home based scale of agricultural 
production is basically used for household consumption as it is often the case in 
rural communities. Sale of home-based agricultural and dairy production has 
rapidly decreased due to the fuel crisis that increased transport difficulties and 
expense. Even the traditional means of mobility, the donkey or horse cart, have 
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become very expensive. 
Women in rural areas have carried the bulk of the burden of such economic 
activities and they have shown better skills and experience, so much so that this 
has come to be considered a women’s domain. The difference here is that rural 
women used to get involved in home agricultural production in rural areas as a 
complementary economic activity while the main source of family income was 
men’s wage labour in Israel. 
The full destruction of the local market in Gaza has also affected many of the 
wealthy families who were involved in medium and large scale trading with Israel. 
Many of them have gone bankrupt as a result of the Israeli restrictions on the 
mobility of goods and people. At the same time a new wealthy group has emerged 
via the manipulation of “illegal” channels of trading. This “merchants of war” 
have utilized the society’s deinstitutionalization and absence of law enforcement- 
even at times supported by political leaders.
The regulated legal trading activities with Israel which used to absorb large 
number of wage labourers, particularly in the construction and food production 
sectors, has been largely destroyed because of the lack of raw materials entering 
from Israel. This has been coupled with the rising of prices of the basic goods 
making the middle and low-income earners hardly able to manage their livelihood 
as before, and the unemployed become more vulnerable and largely exposed to 
food insecurity. To make things worse, most local workshops like metal workers, 
carpenters, bakery owners and skilled construction workers have stopped their 
work because of the absence of raw materials needed. Many of them have gone 
bankrupt or have closed up. Many grocery shops owners, especially in the camps 
and urban areas either closed or continue working by purchasing and selling 
in debt. Large numbers of medium to large scale industrialists have their good 
stored in Karni, paying storage fees and waiting for permits from the Israeli side. 
As an example we have the Eskimo ice cream factory. The owners have been 
waiting for months to be allowed to enter ice cream wrappers and components. 
These entrepreneurs cannot afford to buy illegal goods since they fear Israelis will 
know about it and will definitely stop the entrance of their goods. 
Housewives and Their Families
Housewives or daughters of housewives make up around 95% of the research 
participants in both rural and urban areas. We will try to present how the Israeli 
restrictions and closure policies in Gaza have differentially affected this social 
group and how these effects have contributed in changing gender roles within the 
household and in the wider community. 
We have classified housewives and their families into three main groups 
according to their livelihood resources, utilization of resources, headship and 
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other factors. The research participants helped in a participatory manner in 
shaping the categories by answering the question: “who do you consider the 
most and the least disadvantaged housewives by the Israeli closure of borders and 
military incursions? The categories that emerged were the better off (mastoureen), 
the worse-off, (madyouneen), and female-headed households. The better off and 
worse off are shifting and relative categories, as can be seen below.
Housewives in households with regular income  
earners mastoureen, the better off
These families characterize themselves as mastoureen based on their ability to 
manage their basic needs (food, education, health, transport and other necessary 
house expenses) by relying on their regular sources of income and not being in 
serious debt to others. ‘Others’ here is also ranked in relation to kin closeness, 
where debt from the closest family members like brothers and sisters is more 
manageable than debt to other relatives, neighbours or friends. Women in 
particular prefer to borrow from their parents or sisters, as they think that sisters 
and parents will not embarrass them by asking them to repay the money at a 
specific time. One woman from Beit Hanoun said: when I need money after my 
husband’s income is spent, I just visit one of my sisters to borrow a little money for the 
most urgent things. She does not deal with it as a debt if she has enough money. I most 
of the time go and help her with her domestic work and I take care of her children. 
When she has a baby, I cook for her. 
This group considers themselves better off not because the amount of the 
family total income, but more importantly because of the regularity of the income 
sources in the situation of unprecedented economic and political uncertainty. 
This group was considered poor and very poor before the full siege of Gaza. The 
range of monthly income of the participating families was from NIS 1000 to 
NIS 3000, which is clearly under the national poverty line considering the large 
size of families with a number of members ranging from 6 to 15. Most families 
in this category are those who have one to three government employees, many 
of whom are low-income employees in the various security forces. Families with 
low-income earners are not eligible for regular humanitarian aid, except refugees 
who used to receive food assistance once every three months, and this was stopped 
by the decrease of funds for UNRWA’s food assistance. Women with low-income 
earners are blamed or criticized by other women – who consider them better off, 
if they are seen asking for coupons or other forms of assistance
Most income earners in these families are the sons of now unemployed wage 
labourers who used to work in Israel who were encouraged by their parents to 
apply for employment in the public sector since the beginning of the Israeli 
border closure. Many of the sons have stopped their education and dropped out 
REvIEW OF WOMEN STUDIES  ARTICLES  27
of school or university for the sake of keeping a regular job, when it proved 
hopeless that their fathers could go back to their work in Israel. Large numbers of 
low-income earners got married early and live with their unemployed fathers in 
the extended family setting, becoming financially responsible for all members of 
the family (parents, sisters, brothers, and their own children). They also bear the 
responsibility for educating their brothers and sisters. 
Mothers usually control their married sons’ income and wives in many cases 
find themselves almost destitute. The wives have to accept that their husbands’ 
income is for the whole extended family including married and unmarried 
brothers who are jobless. The income is distributed according to the priorities of 
the whole family expenses while the income earners’ wives and children may get 
the least. This has created contestation between female members of the family 
(mothers in law, sisters in law and daughters in law). In certain cases, nevertheless 
the wives of the breadwinners are given more attention and respect as they are 
appreciated for their dynamism in searching sources of aid and for bearing such 
a situation. Some young married women put their personal security at stake and 
may get in conflict with family members to preserve their autonomy and live 
in a separate house while still respecting their husbands’ responsibility towards 
extended family. Some other young married women, especially in the camps, 
have used these circumstances for their own benefit by increasing their mobility, 
getting involved in temporary jobs, being more active in community institutions, 
making social visits and taking decisions about their children. 
A middle age woman from Al Maghazi presented her family situation by 
saying: 
My husband is a public employee who earns NIS 2500 a month and I have 10 
children. We used to be comfortable before the closure. My husband’s brothers 
used to work in Israel and we used to borrow money from them when necessary. 
Since my brothers in law stopped their work, my husband has been obliged 
to support them. So part of our income goes to pay for the families of my two 
brothers-in-law. If he doesn’t do this, his old parents will be angry with him 
and we are not in need for family troubles. I have to manage with what is left 
sometimes by reducing my children’s expenses. Two of them are in the university 
and everything is getting triply expensive. This forced me to go out and apply for 
job creation projects. I am illegible for these jobs since in principle my husband 
has an income, but I was able to get something anyway. I have recently become 
very active with the benevolent associations, attending all their activities and 
whenever they have food assistance they register my name.. I know that we are 
better off than thousands of other families who have no sources of income, and 
they deserve the assistance more than us. Although we live a very modest life, 
the income we earn is not sufficient until the mid of the month. I buy meat or 
chicken once a week. I don’t buy fruits and clothes. I myself have not bought 
any new clothes for more than 4 years. 
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Another group of families earn low income from labouring in small factories and 
companies, which still operate in Gaza, or own a taxi or donkey/horse cart for 
petty-trading, or a small grocery stand in the local market. Their income however 
helpful in providing for the basic family expenses is not regular or certain. Many 
of the taxi drivers for example have stopped their work since the fuel crisis. Those 
who have carts and use them for rides have now more advantages. Those who 
owned agricultural lands used to be mastoureen in the first few years of the Intifada, 
but the Israeli continuous incursions on the border areas has made agricultural 
land unusable and/or inaccessible. Families with small plots of land located away 
from the Israeli borders are better off than the big landowners. 
Unskilled labourers are in a better position than skilled labourers since unskilled 
ones accept any kind of job offered to them even if with low wages if they 
are regular. Skilled labourers are faced with the closure of most construction 
companies - which used to be the largest sector of employment in Gaza before 
the borders closure - or have largely reduced their skilled (and thus higher 
salaried) staff. 
The mastoureen families during the Intifada were mostly the families who used 
to be poor or very poor during the relative economic stability when the Israeli 
market was open for Palestinian wage labourers. The regularity of income rather 
than the sufficiency of income is at all times the critical element of livelihood 
security. Women of this group know that at the end of the month they receive an 
income and they adapt their needs accordingly. The first thing they do with the 
income is to repay either all or part of the debt, and the rest is used for the basic 
expenses prioritizing education. Women of this group reduce their household 
expenses and consumption to the minimum in order to avoid debt or to reduce 
debt. Food as they repeatedly say is manageable, no one sees what we eat at home, 
but it is hard to have someone knocking at our door to ask for his money. We eat lentils 
for a week with no problem. 
Age and education are no longer determinant factors of power within family 
and community. The one who earns an income and contributes to the survival of 
the family is given more attention by the parents. This is relevant with employed 
women within the family. A female employee in the family is given preference at 
the expense of the boys as she sacrifices for her family. While daughters in these 
families are given more autonomy and respect by their parents and brothers, at 
the same time they would prefer to see them getting married. A mother from Al 
Maghazi said:
My daughter since she graduated, she has been working in temporary jobs 
and we basically depend on her salary besides the little money we earn from a 
grocery shop. Although we need her income I want her to get married. She is 
now 24 years old and she refuses all suitors because she thinks that they want 
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her because of her salary. I don’t want my daughter to be anesa (unmarried/
spinster) at the end. 
One woman in her early 50’s from Beit Hanoun said:
I regret that I helped my two eldest daughters complete their university 
education. I struggled a lot to provide them with the money they needed. Half 
of my husband’s salary went for their education. Both of them are now sitting 
at home not able to find a job. People come to ask for the younger daughter for 
marriage and they don’t think about the eldest. If they earn an income, they 
may marry. I feel so sad for them, what is the benefit of their education if they 
get older and don’t marry. Men in Beit Hanoon don’t prefer educated woman. 
Families with regular income are however better off than families with no sources 
of income. Women in these families have taken a leading role in managing their 
limited income. They balance every penny of the income and the household 
expenses. One young woman in her mid 20’s from Al Maghazi camp lives in 
a rented house with her husband and her 4 children because her mother in 
law’s house is too small to accommodate them. Her husband works as a public 
employee with an income of NIS 1.200 and he is the sole income earner in the 
extended family. She pays 300 NIS for the rent, around 500 NIS goes to her 
husband’s family who is constituted of eight members, and she has only 400 
NIS to be used for all her nuclear family’s expenses during the month. Since this 
young wife finished her Tawjihi she tried to earn some money by giving private 
lessons for children, but she had to stop because her house is too small to do so. 
She avoids borrowing money from anybody because she knows that if she starts to 
borrow, she will soon be in crisis and she will not be able to repay. She sometimes 
gets money from her parents and sisters to pay for her children’s kindergarten 
or clothes. She doesn’t tell her parents that her husband gives around half of 
his salary for his family because she does not want to embarrass him. She also 
does not tell her husband that she gets some money from her parents to avoid 
his anger. She considers what her husband does as his duty towards his natal 
family (parents, brothers and sisters), even though it is at the expense of his own 
children. She does not ask her husband to pay for his child’s kindergarten in order 
not to make him feel guilty that he does not have money. She rather pays for it 
from the money she gets from her parents. Nevertheless, this woman considers 
herself much better off than other families who mostly live in debt without any 
prospect of possible repayment. 
Men of this group leave willingly their income under the control of women 
as they admit that women are more able to manage the family expenses than 
men, and also to avoid any tension within the family. Some men, especially the 
unmarried income earners, ask only for their pocket money for their cigarettes 
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and transport and do not get involved in any details related to their income: I do 
not need any additional headache, since I believe the income is not enough even for 
half a month! They leave mothers and wives to manage the daily expenditures, 
as they know how to buy cheaper items and how to reduce the expenses to the 
minimum. This encourages the wives of low-income earners to do shopping, a 
practice that was not the usual in the past. 
Second: Housewives of families in debt crisis:  
madyouneen, the worse off
This social group has sharply increased after June 2007. They include families 
with small and micro businesses that were closed off after the full siege of Gaza, 
families of metal workers, carpenters, construction workers and small traders 
with Israel or/and Egypt. The families of former Israeli wage labourers (skilled 
and unskilled) are the largest proportion of the group. Many of these households 
have large number of dependent children including university students and 
unemployed. Many of them have spent their savings and sold their household 
and personal assets (money in cash, jewellery, unnecessary household furniture 
or equipment) in the first few years of the Intifada (2000 to 2004) thus losing 
all resources. Many men in this group are skilled in different sectors but they are 
unable to find a relatively stable job because the private sector has lost almost 
all capacity to absorb wage labourers, and many businesses rely on the labour of 
family members to survive. The only source of income this group of men receives 
has been the temporary jobs (the unemployment scheme of the UNRWA and 
other aid organisations- a three months contract cycle, sometimes only 20 days 
every six months) where most men mentioned they had only benefited once from 
one cycle since the loss of their jobs. Some of the skilled labourers tried to work 
as piece workers whenever neighbours or relatives needed them but with the 
lack of raw materials they have even lost this opportunity. They have no options 
to manage the fulfilment of their daily needs except by aid or borrowing. Debt 
is stated as ranging from $2.000 to $5.000, excluding electric and water bills 
unpaid by years. Refugee families are more in debt than rural families.
These families started to borrow money from close relatives in the early years of 
the Intifada with no idea that the situation will get worse. They also purchased in 
debt from the supermarket or the grocery shops, and left the cash they have to buy 
vegetables and other necessities from the local market. Recently, the techniques 
of borrowing have changed and become part of women’s responsibility. Women 
borrow in very small amounts like 50 NIS or 100 NIS from neighbours, friends 
or relatives and they try to repay it in a very short period whenever they receive 
money. This is a technique used by women to create trust with neighbours or 
friends and thus be able to borrow another time in the future. Many women 
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mentioned that they sold many of the coupons they received to repay the small 
amounts of money they borrowed from their neighbours. 
Men of this group feel utterly hopeless and have left the responsibility for 
household management for their wives. As described by their wives, they become 
despondent and careless. Skilled labourers are in a worse situation than unskilled 
labourers because, as said before, the latter accepts any temporary job offered be 
it in cleaning, gardening or service delivery. The former group still considers low 
status jobs humiliating and not bearable. This of course places the whole burden 
on the women to search for survival resources.
Women of this group are the worst off because they are not only responsible 
for the family’s livelihood but also carry the burden of the psychological effects 
of the closures on their husbands. Most of these women used to be better off 
before the closure as they repeatedly said: we used to be in a good standard of living- 
musatatin- only busy with our domestic work and children. 
Women who had lands in rural areas, used to employ wage labour to help 
them in cultivating their land while their husbands were busy with their work in 
Israel. One woman from Beit Hanoun said:
I have never thought that one day we will come to live in poverty and 
deprivation. Before the Intifada, I used to spend at least 100 NIS a day to buy 
meat and chicken to cook for my children and my husband. Today, I spend 
200 NIS during a whole month. Thanks God, my husband and my children 
are not demanding any more. My husband accepts to eat whatever I cook. If 
I knew that we might face such a situation, I would have saved all the money 
I spent on food to buy jewellery. The jewellery of women has rescued many 
families from hunger, but it sure doesn’t stay for ever.
Refugee women within this category have been facing much harder life than rural 
women. Many women in the camp do not live close by to their close relatives 
(parents, brothers and sisters), which place them in serious trouble when they are 
in urgent need of cash money. Their lack of cash is only relieved by the sale of 
some items from the UNRWA food assistance or from the little financial assistance 
from close relatives. Very few women mentioned that they receive remittances 
from their relatives abroad. Rural women are slightly different because they live 
close by to relatives, or they can sell some of the poultry or the vegetables they 
produce for family consumption.
One woman from Al Maghazi said: 
I always feel afraid that any of my children will get sick and be in urgent need 
to go to the hospital while I am bankrupt mufalsa. The hospital asks between 
20 and 30 NIS for registration and medicine. This is why I keep the money 
I get from my parents and brothers when I visit them once a month, just for 
emergency cases like sickness. I don’t tell my husband about this money because 
I need to use it for my children’s urgent needs. 
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When these women were asked about their personal security, they first mentioned 
the huge debt they had to their relatives, some neighbours and the grocery shop. 
Many of the participants of the focus groups in the different communities asserted 
that they do not visit siblings and other relatives because neither they nor their 
husbands are able to repay the money. [This proves to be contradictory to the 
statement than to have loans from family is “lighter” than to have it from strangers, 
but nevertheless in the long run it is lighter since relatives will not come to force 
the payment of the debt]. Many family members are now in conflict because of 
their inability to repay debt. A woman from el Sayamat/Rafah mentioned that 
she changed her normal direction to the health clinic and to the local market in 
order to avoid the grocery shop owner. She does not want to see him and have to 
be reminded of her debt when she does not know when she will be able even to 
repay a part of it. Women in debt become socially isolated to avoid embarrassment 
for not being able to repay. They hardly manage with their basic needs. They are 
mostly between the ages of 30 and 40, wives of former Israeli labourers. They were 
not used to go outside the home, do shopping or communicate with strangers. 
They are not educated so they have no possibility of thinking about a job. They 
started to learn these things after the closure. Some of them were forced to apply 
for temporary jobs to do cleaning in UNRWA and non-government institutions. 
Several mentioned that they searched for a job to clean in homes without their 
husbands’ knowing in order to earn money to feed their children. They were very 
embarrassed and unconfident in the first time they left home to ask for coupons 
or assistance. Many women both in rural and urban areas mentioned that they 
made a basta for their young sons in order to earn some money for their basic 
daily expenses. Women from the camp rarely thought about doing business because 
their homes are very small for home-based production. Women who had trading 
experience before continued but at very small scale and from home. 
Many rural women got involved in trading their agricultural produce with 
neighbours and relatives. This group of women is not considered old enough 
to go and sit in the market. It is still considered aeb (shameful) for women in 
their 20’s or 30’s to trade in the local market. Women who are still involved in 
petty trading are those who started their work before the closure (cross-border 
traders) and they are mostly in the age of 40’s and over. These women continued 
their work dealing with local wholesale traders, but in much smaller scale than 
before.
When women of this group were asked about changes in their husbands’ 
behaviours, they all asserted that they have changed dramatically but in two 
contradictory trajectories:
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Become tolerant, calm, cooperative and home- based:a) 
Many men from both camps and rural areas have changed their behaviour with 
their wives and daughters. They became tolerant and do not exercise restrictions 
on their wives’ and daughters’ mobility. Middle age husbands in both camps and 
rural areas are more tolerant than sons and brothers. Some women mentioned 
that they are restricted in mobility by their sons not by their husbands. Young 
women confirmed that they face more troubles from their brothers than from their 
fathers. Fathers encourage their daughters to finish their university education, 
and are very reluctant to impose marriage on them. The experience with closure 
has produced change in their attitudes towards women’s education and work. In 
a situation of men’s unemployment, men perceive women’s regular income as a 
source of livelihood security. They encourage their daughters to find regular jobs 
in the public sector as nurse, teachers or social workers. 
Some men became very cooperative with their wives and they share domestic 
work, especially those who live in nuclear families. They also have left to them 
the management of their household’s expenses and consumption and they rarely 
interfere. They admit similar to the first group that women are more able and 
capable in household management. Many men, especially the middle aged, 
showed their respect and appreciation to their wives and older daughters for 
bearing their men’s joblessness. They confirmed that women try to follow up the 
children demands without letting them know in order to avoid their anger and 
maintain peace within the family. Men also mentioned that it is only women who 
can find ways to meet the urgent needs for the family, as they do not hesitate to 
borrow and ask for assistance, which is hard to do for men.
A man from Al Maghazi said:
One day I discovered that some of the kitchen items we had were not there any 
longer. I asked my wife about them. She said that she had lent them to her 
sister. I shouted to her and I got angry. Then she told me that the reality was 
that she sold them one day when she was in urgent need of money. I was very 
sad. I also noticed my wife asked her sisters for their children’s clothes which 
don’t fit them as they get older. My wife never cooked khubeiza (wild growing 
green leaf ) before, she didn’t like it; now she cooks anything and I don’t say a 
word. I now often sit with her discussing and negotiating what to do to survive. 
I trust her opinion.
It does not appear that there is a link between men’s education and their attitudes 
towards their wives and daughter. Rural and refugee middle age men with less 
education are more tolerant than young educated men. This may be related to the 
more social and cultural isolation of young men as a result of the Israeli mobility 
restrictions. Many women in their late 20s and 30s noticed that their husbands 
asked them to stop bearing children because of the family livelihood crisis and 
encouraged them to use contraceptives. 
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Become violent, despondent and trouble maker:b) 
A small number of women mentioned that their men became more violent, 
careless and despondent. This is noticed more amongst families of educated and 
skilled labourers who have been jobless for many years. Wives consider violence 
and carelessness as a reflection of men’s feeling of hopelessness and lack of meaning 
while they cannot accept any low status jobs offered to them. Young married 
women suffer more than middle age women from their husbands’ violence. This 
is explained by the fact that middle age women rely on their teenage sons to earn 
some income while young married women’s children are very young and helpless. 
Women who have violent husbands try to protect themselves by not demanding 
anything from their husbands and manage their daily life by themselves. Those 
who live in nuclear families are less safe than those who live in an extended family. 
Members of the extended family, especially mothers and fathers, support young 
married women with violent jobless husbands. This support however does not 
make real change, but it gives young women spiritual support. Violent husbands 
appear to be careless and not responding to family intervention. Some have become 
drug addicts. Married men direct their violence usually towards their children 
and not their wives, especially those who have wives responsible for household 
survival (who receive coupons, trade from home, or do sewing). Women who 
were hit mentioned that they were hit while trying to protect their children. 
In many cases, women of this group justified their husbands’ violence and try 
to cope with it in order to protect their children. They justify their husbands’ 
violence by their joblessness. Some of the violent husbands used to be violent 
before and some others became violence after they lost their jobs. It is also noticed 
in some cases that some husbands, especially the younger and less educated, beat 
their wives to show their manhood and power in the family where other sources 
of men’s power/manhood have disappeared. 
A few cases mentioned that the families hardship made young married 
housewives face double forms of violence from her husband and her family-in 
law members, especially women. A refugee 27 years old mother said:
My husband is jobless. I have four young children and I never before went out 
of the house to search for coupons. I didn’t finish my Tawjihi. I live a miserable 
life. My parents and my brothers are very poor. My mother and brothers in law 
live attached to us and they just survive. I was forced to go out and apply for 
institutions to get coupons. What else can I do? I put the neqab in order to hide 
myself when I go out. My mother and sisters in law always irritate my husband 
against me while I am out to shop or to search for coupons. I don’t know if they 
feel jealous or what? They don’t know that I would love to stay at home and not 
go anywhere. What I am doing is not a pleasure. I lock the door on my children 
while I go out and my husband is careless. Every time I go out he comes back 
home and beats me until he makes me shout loudly to make sure his mother 
and sisters know that he is the man of the house. I know this and I try because 
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of my children to shut my mouth and to bear the pain of violence. When my 
husband calms down, I talk with him and explain the reasons for my going 
out. He understands and sometimes he apologizes and excuses himself.
Personal security for this group of jobless and resource-less men has become 
concentrated on the home domain, they either become calm and cooperative or 
violent. The first option as is expected, makes women more secure and develop 
further their autonomy. The violence option further victimizes women. Social and 
kin networks and relations have largely diminished their role in the case of families 
in serious debt. As a result, men have become socially isolated and depressed and 
women become the bearers of the economic, social and psychological effects. 
Many women mentioned that they do not speak to their parents and brothers 
when they suffer the violence of their husbands. They sort out their problems by 
bargaining and deception, or cope by hiding the daily troubles from relatives and 
neighbours. Children in these cases are the most disadvantaged. 
Third: Housewives Who are Household Heads:  
ghalbaneen, least okay
This social group has increased since the beginning of the Intifada because of the 
large number of men who died or became handicapped by the Israeli incursions 
and the internal Palestinian conflict between Fatah and Hamas. Another reason, 
which is clearly noticed during the fieldwork, is that many able bodied husbands 
who used to work in Israel before the border closure became physically or mentally 
ill by the tremendous stress they experienced after the closure. Large number of 
ill male-headed families has become entitled to the help of the Ministry of Social 
affairs and the UNRWA safety net program. According to the national social policies 
adopted by the Palestinian government, unemployed women who lost their male 
breadwinners in case of death, divorce or chronic sickness are considered the head 
of their households and they are entitled to regular cash or/and food assistance. 
Female-headed families are culturally perceived as destitute, basically because 
women become the sole responsible for provisioning and caring and for the overall 
management of their households. Although it is true that according to the national 
measures of poverty in Palestinian society female headship has been associated with 
poverty and destitution, the qualitative data for the period of closure and siege on 
Gaza does not prove that female-headed families are the worst off of all the families. 
However poor they are, following the national economic standards, they are not the 
poorest from the wider socio-economic and cultural perspective on poverty. 
For a small group of married women, men’s loss of their primary functioning 
role as providers is associated with a loss of social value. Nevertheless, the majority 
of women still believe that the physical existence of a man within the family 
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regardless of his “temporary” status is by itself a social value and a source of 
personal and social security. In spite that female heads of household are better 
off comparing with the worst-off group above, as they are secure about their 
livelihood sustenance, they are still largely perceived in the society as powerless 
especially in the case of women with dependent children. The main reason that 
legitimised them appears to be their double role as provider/male and as a mother/
women at same time. Women, who lost their male breadwinners, even if they earn 
sufficient income from other sources, are considered ghalbaneen and it is thought 
they are always in need of compassion from others. This is a reflection of the 
dominant patriarchal culture reinforced perhaps by the increasing Islamization 
of Gaza society. The presence of men (fathers, husbands and adult sons) is still 
the main source of women’s personal and social security. Women confirmed these 
feelings by saying: rihatt el rajel walla adamu, meaning the smell of a man is better 
than his absence. Another common saying used by women from different ages el 
mara bedoon rajel tetshahtat means a woman without a man is humiliated. Thil el 
rajel wa’la thil el kheta, the shadow of a man is better than that of the wall. This 
reflects a static perception of women’s social identity regardless of the changing 
gender roles and responsibilities of material and financial provisioning. 
Summary of findings
The participants’ understanding of the effects of Israeli closure and restrictions is 
defined by their inability to provide for their personal security and to manage a 
“dignified” livelihood. The indicators used by the participants to measure peoples’ 
ability to manage the provision of daily needs are the availability of material 
resources and the possibility of disposing of these resources, and not being forced 
to become indebted, in particular to strangers. 
All rational options undertaken by both men and women are however situational 
and provisional, they are all a reflection of the gender-based consciousness of both 
men and women accumulated across generations in rural and urban areas and 
amongst refugees. Here is a list of gender-based options or reactions undertaken 
differently by both men and women to adapt to the consequences of the Israeli 
prolonged restrictions since the beginning of the Intifada.
First: Changes in mobility
Men’s loss of income sources and their inability to provide the main needs for 
their families, especially their children has reflected in their desire to isolate 
themselves from their social surroundings. Women have increased their mobility 
to search for basic livelihood’s resources, by participating in charitable associations 
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in order to receive food assistance. Men’s social isolation is not their free choice, 
but a mechanism to hide their feeling of uselessness and powerlessness. Women’s 
mobility does not largely however exceed the local community settings including 
relatives, neighbours, friends, local market, community associations, clinic and 
schools. Interestingly, housewives are often more mobile than women in the 
formal labour force (teachers, nurses and other public employees). The mobility of 
married middle age and old women is more than that of young women searching 
for livelihood sources. 
Second: Changes in daily routine
Among other new behaviour’s described for men is to stay awake all night to 
guard the family from the Israeli incursions or any other form of military threat, 
particularly in the border areas, and to sleep during the day. Their preference 
to sleep during the day consciously or unconsciously reflects their intention to 
escape from the daily family/children’s demands. Men spend their night watching 
TV and playing cards to kill time. Women in contrast have to intensify their daily 
work and have to deal with their children’s demands calmly and deliberately. 
Husbands in most cases help their wives in home-based production, but they 
do not consider these tasks as “real” or valuable work. Both men and women 
are forced because of their families’ livelihood crisis to do tasks that are not 
constituent of their social value. The changing of men and women’s daily routine 
is a response to necessity and coercive, not optional.
Third: Changes in economic participation  
(formal and informal sectors)
Women’s participation in the formal labour force has been also influenced by 
the families’ economic crisis where women are forced to search for formal jobs 
with associations, regardless of work conditions. The priority for women is to 
find a regular source of income even if the type of work is inferior and from 
their point of view humiliating. Job creation programs have enhanced women’s 
participation in the formal labour force in the form of three months’ temporary 
job contracts. On the other hand, women’s participation in the informal sector 
and their interest to have loans for private enterprises has massively declined 
because of the economic structural constraints. This has pushed both educated 
and uneducated, housewives and unemployed women to search for regular jobs 
or/and humanitarian assistance.
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Fourth: Access to education
Although children’s education is still presented by both men and women as 
the most important source of sustainable livelihood, the increasing economic 
pressures have forced many parents to jeopardize their children’s higher education. 
University education for girls and boys seems equally valued by all parents alike 
in rural, urban areas as well as in the camps. Nevertheless, in the situation of 
livelihood crisis, parents show their preference to have their male children drop 
out of schools and universities rather than their girls. This is very much related 
to their understanding of the newly emerged context where young graduated 
women have better access to socially accepted jobs with institutions than young 
male graduates. 
Fifth: Violence against women and children
The Israeli destruction of family livelihood resources and the inability of 
traditional family relations and networks to cope with the changing situation has 
created a motivating atmosphere for male domestic violence that is often justified 
by women as produced by the stressful situation of loss of resources. Women’s 
justification of husbands’ violence does not imply women’s loss of self-respect, but 
it is rather a reflection of women’s emotional support to their husbands who lost 
their sense of manhood and power as a result of men’s inability to provide for the 
needs of the family. This on the other hand emphasizes women’s conception and 
practice of womanhood as subordinated to men regardless of the actual roles and 
responsibilities they hold as the primary provider during the family crisis. Sexual 
violence is however not frequently discussed. There are number of signs showing 
its increase, but it is still an invisible issue that needs further investigation. 
 
Sixth: Changes in marriage patterns
Marriage patterns are influenced by the family’s poverty and vulnerability and 
by the situation of personal insecurity. The changes are more in the rituals and 
procedures of marriage than in its social value for the reproduction of social and 
gender relations. There are differences according to geographical location and 
socio-economic groups with regards to the changes occurred in marriage patterns. 
The age of marriage increased amongst educated men and women and decreased 
amongst uneducated women. Marriage expenses and dowry have largely been 
reduced amongst couples who are kin, but very slightly amongst non-relatives. 
Polygamy has increased amongst unemployed married men who became interested 
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to marry employed women. Parents prefer to support their daughters’ education 
as this may provide them with better opportunity of marriage.
Seventh: Changes in youth perception of gender  
and their aspirations
The closure and the Israeli restriction contribute largely to shift youth (men and 
women) towards conservatism because of the absence of modern opportunities 
of employment and social interaction. Young men and women have become 
closer to the gender-bias tradition and culture as a source of social and personal 
protection. Even amongst highly educated women and men and those who are 
regularly employed, their attitudes about gender have not obviously changed and 
most of them do not believe in gender equity and equality. While females showed 
higher potential to challenge the family livelihood crisis through their formal 
education, male youths grow increasingly frustrated and apathetic. Female youths 
however prioritize marriage as determinant of their social security. They become 
much more concerned about high education and employment as critical elements 
for a better standard of marriage life.
Postscript: April 2009
Two months after the war, UN agencies and NGO’s have produced numerous 
sector surveys of the damages and losses during the Israeli war on Gaza in 
December 2008 - January 2009. Even a “survey of surveys” has been posted on 
the OCHA website providing access to all kinds of damage-related information. 
With Israel’s ongoing closure and blockade of the entry of building materials, 
elements needed for the early recovery phase are nowhere to be seen. 
Israel’s war on Gaza has created new groups of worse off people, particularly 
those who have lost their houses and possessions and are displaced in host houses 
(at around eight thousand host families), in tent camps or living in the ruins of 
their lost homes. Host families are under intense pressure not only for space but 
also for much needed essential daily needs – needs already pressing before January 
2009 due to the ongoing economic deterioration created by the economic boycott 
that Gaza suffers. Although aid has reached many it is never enough to heal the 
pain of the loss of life’s work and the loss especially of family members.
Conversations with staff at Gaza’s Mental Health Program, as well as UNRWA 
personnel indicate that family violence is becoming more visible after the war. 
As noted in the report, this violence is justified by the women in the family 
as understandably related to the loss of the role of the man as the provider. 
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Interference in family problems is delicate because it can work against the victims. 
Gaza organisations working to prevent family violence are trying to encourage 
men to come to them and help fight it by making clear the situation is not their 
fault but part of a much larger political paradigm.
All Gazans were affected by the war in one-way or another if not physically, 
emotionally. People are tired and in spite of their traditional resilience, hopes 
are fragile. Access of goods is unsure, one week salt was forbidden to enter; the 
next week was the turn of washing powder. At the beginning of April, both the 
strawberry and sardine season were threatened: there were no strawberry seedlings 
allowed through the crossings, and fishermen, their equipment deteriorating, 
cannot take their boats out to sea beyond the 3m limit set by Israel and are 
subject to attack. Gazans want to live and families face needs that only grow as 
the situation deterioriates. The passing of the time without decisive action to 
end the blockade and siege undermines survival in the present and hope for the 
future.
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FOCUS ON GAZA
voices from Another War:  
Refugee Women in Gaza Tell of War and 
Survival in 1948 and its Aftermath
Rema Hammami
“The past is not dead. It’s not even past.”
William Faulker 
Using interviews originally conducted for her doctoral thesis, 
Between Heaven and Earth Transformation of Religiosity 
and labor among Peasant Refugee Women in South Coastal 
Palestine/the Gaza Strip, 1922-1992), Rema Hammami 
sheds light on the Gazan present through evoking parallels with 
the past. Women’s voices recount the horror of massive aerial 
bombardment, of the destruction of home and family, and of 
struggling to survive and “feed the children” in the 1948 nakba 
and its aftermath. 
Rema Hammami is Associate Professor at the Institute of Women’s 
Studies.
From November 1947 when the United Nations partition plan was announced 
until the final armistice agreement in February 1949 between Israel and Egypt, 
the population of Palestine’s southern district lived in a state of permanent flight 
and war. What had started out as ongoing attacks by nearby Israeli settlers on 
village communities evolved over the months into major battles on multiple 
military fronts between the Egyptian army and the newly re-named IDF. The fate 
of communities became tied to the evolution of the fighting – with displacement 
happening in stages in line with the changing fate of the Egyptian military. The 
Israelis finally broke through the Egyptian lines in October 1948 in what they 
named “Operation Yoav” – pushing the Egyptian army out of its last strongholds 
and into what became the Gaza Strip. By then more than 200,000 refugees had 
sought sanctuary there. But the war wasn’t over. In December 1948, in Operation 
Horav, Israel made a major offensive against the Egyptians, trying to push them 
out of the Gaza Strip. The refugees who had survived the earlier phases of the war 
but had lost everything were now once again under Israeli bombardment.
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A little written-about aspect of the war of 1948 in the southern district was 
the use by Israel of aerial bombing. Just prior to the Partition, the Palmach had 
only 11 single engine light aircraft but by the end of the armistice agreements, 
it had built up a large fleet including Spitfires and B-17 bombers. Thus by July 
1948, in only the first six days of that month, the newly formed IAF had dropped 
more than 48 tons of bombs in over 82 sorties – the vast majority of them in the 
southern district. In that same month according to Aloni,…”IAF fighters failed 
to locate el Arish and attacked targets of opportunity — most likely civilians in 
Gaza — instead”. During Operation Yoav, they dropped more than 151 tonnes 
of bombs in over 230 sorties.1
During the Nakbe, Um Ahmad and Um Subhi from the villages of Huleigat 
and Hammama both became young widows; and in its aftermath they became 
refugees in Gaza. The following are excerpts from interviews undertaken with 
them during the late 1980s.
Um Ahmad’s village Huleigat fell during the first part of Operation Yoav in 
October 1948. Majdal fell in early November and Hammama, Um Subhi’s village 
also fell in early November in the third stage of Operation Yoav. Um Subhi and Um 
Ahmad probably arrived in Gaza about the same time – in November 1948.
The Hijra
Um Ahmad, Huleigat village: “one by one the villages were falling”
Me, my daughter died when we were leaving and my husband had died two 
months before. My daughter was killed when the airplanes bombed us, the planes 
first bombed us in the village, whoever had her husband took her children and 
fled. Me, my husband was already dead, the Jews were attacking the villages, one 
by one the villages were falling. Where the Jews attacked the men would go to 
fight them, the other villages and the fighters would gather to fight. My husband 
was with the fighters, carrying weapons and he died from a heart attack. That was 
two months before the hijra. 
The Jews would attack at night, at one or two in the morning, whoever was 
awake would wake the others, people would flee to the fields, hide in the vines. 
And who didn’t wake up would be in his house and they’d come by and kill them, 
just like that, shoot them, butcher them; young men, children, the elderly, young 
girls – just execute them. Every night they’d be coming to the village.
 The (Egyptian) forces had been in another village, then they came to ours 
and then they left it for Majdal. We ended up wherever they were. Once they 
left to Majdal we left with them. Then the Egyptians would stay and fight and 
the people would flee – they’d flee to Gaza or Rafah, the people left and it was 
left the army and the villages. The Jews would come to a village whoever they’d 
find they’d kill, whoever went back to get their children a handful of wheat, 
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they’d find and kill, and destroy the houses, destroy the village, burn it down, 
the village houses were from mud not concrete, they’d burn it and bulldoze the 
whole village. Finally I came (to Gaza) the Egyptians brought me and my son, the 
medical forces brought me with the army, then my parents found me. 
Um Subhi, Hammama village: “One day you’re making bread and the next 
day there’s killing and bombing.”
The Jews kept making attacks, we’d go out into the fields and find the Jews there, 
they’d come and shoot at us, shoot at old people not just young men. The young 
men would fight back — attack their convoys, they’d come and kill two or three 
young men. The planes would come and bomb the houses people would flee out 
to the fields, under the cactus and the olives. We’d stay there all night in the dark 
and in the morning start going back home – we wouldn’t dare until there was 
light. But then the attacks would start again, shooting, people would get killed, 
the planes would come and bomb again – we’d flee back to the fields under the 
olives and grape vines. We’d grab the kids and hold them tight and sit. No food 
no water. The whole village together, the whole of Hammama. 
And then after some time people started coming from other villages, from the 
direction of Isdud, from Beit Daras, from Zarnuqa from Faluja all fleeing to our 
village; all of them in the fields, under the olives and fig trees – all of them sitting 
there with their families
Then the planes came and started bombing us out in the fields. One day 
you’re making bread and the next day there’s killing and bombing. We all fled 
towards the sea. The mukhtar comes and says we should all go back towards the 
village. He puts a white flag on a pole and starts walking towards the trenches 
where the Jews are and they shoot him. He’s carrying a white shawl on a pole and 
they shoot him. We surrendered and they shot. 
The Egyptians came, we only benefitted from them when they left Isdud. 
They started telling us to flee. People started leaving from the sea on small fishing 
boats. Me and my family we left by donkey – me and my kids, we put the kids in 
saddlebags on that donkey and we go to Gaza. My husband had been killed two 
days before. He was guarding our field of peanuts — we had grapes and that field 
of peanuts and he and three others went out to guard them – scared that people 
would take them. As he was coming back along the seashore the Jews saw him 
and killed him. I had just had my son a week before and my relatives found my 
husband and brought me his body – carried him back on a camel. I was young 
and ignorant with six children, three girls and three boys, I left with my parents 
and sisters carrying those six kids on that donkey to gaza. We left everything 
behind, cheese and clothes and grain and chickens.
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First Months in Gaza
They pack the sidewalks, take up the vacant lots and the public market, occupy 
barnyards, and generally seem to fill in every space...They live in churches mosques 
and schools.2
Um Ahmad: selling pieces of her headdress to buy milk
All I had left was my son Ahmad. When we first came we stayed in houses in 
Shujaiyya [village]. They used to divide their houses among us and measure out 
a section for each person the size of a floor tile. They’d divide it between us for 
40 qurush a month — an area the size of your mattress for 40 qurush a month 
— and just at night. During the day, you’d go out to the fields and gather wood 
and try and make bread. I stayed with my family because my son was only a year 
old. People made bread with anything they could find. Then some small rations 
came. In the beginning what did they give people — they’d give one and a half 
rutls every 15 days — if they have a small family they can take that and live but 
with a big family they’d get it and it would be gone. Whoever had some money 
with them would sell and spend. If she has riyals on her head she takes them and 
sells, if she has a bit of gold she sells it, if she has a thobe she sells it...I sold things 
that I didn’t need to spend on the boy. Then I began to sell from my wuqayya 
(headdress). When Ahmad was born my wuqayya had been covered with money 
— even my daughter who died had money on her wuqayya. I started to cut a 
piece off and sell it and buy milk for the boy. Every day I’d buy for him with two 
qurush. Every week I’d sell another riyal off my wuqayya for 12 qurush, 15 qurush. 
When he got a little older and there was his paternal aunt living with us — an 
old woman, God bless her — when that money finished she got up left and went 
to stay with her sister. 
Um Subhi: bombing people on the beach
We got to the seashore of Gaza and we were there three days and then the planes 
came again and started bombing people on the beach, so again we fled, we walked 
all the way until Khan Yunis because the planes were bombing people. We made 
a shack on the beach there in Khan yunis, with sticks and bags and whatever we 
could find. Not just us, everyone, every shack had six families in them each one 
had their corner. Then they started distributing rations and we’d walk two hours 
from the beach to Khan Yunis and carry that bag on our head and beg for some 
wood so we could cook. We’d be making bread and it was raining.
One day I was at the ration station getting the rations and the planes came 
and started bombing – right into the crowd, people tried to run wherever they 
could, someone lost their hand, another their leg, people were killed, suddenly 
there’s a fire and my face and hair is burnt – they thought I was dead – it took 
me a year to recover.
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Survival
Um Ahmad: “all the women were working”
The first work I did was in the fields for people from Jabaliya, from Beit Hanun 
— for anyone who was harvesting. We people were good together and with each 
other — the ones who had and the one’s who didn’t. We’d go pick okra, tomatoes 
with the people who had — they’d give us a shilling for our pay and feed us lunch 
— I’d save the shilling for the boy and the food for me, and what wasn’t cooked 
I’d take it to my brother’s wife and give to her and say, “I need the shilling for my 
boy.” If we picked melons they’d give us melons, if we picked faqqus they’d give 
us faqqus. We’d harvest wheat and we’d get some; barley we’d get some...There 
were are a lot of women in my position. The women had to work to get firewood, 
she’d go and hoe, harvest — all the women were working not just me — 50 or 
60 women we’d be working in the fields. We worked for a shilling — for pay 
here with the Gazans — with people with land — we’d work for four qurush or 
a shilling…
 I was still a young woman and ignorant I didn’t like to know people because I 
was young and a widow — I wouldn’t get involved with people. From my house 
to work — even my neighbor there’s only this wall between us but I would have 
never gone and sat with them. When I’d harvest, my sweat would be pouring and 
my face would be red, I’d get some clay spit in it and put it on my face, I was 
scared my face would be rosy. I didn’t mix with the people or let anyone know 
my name, they’d say, “Hey, girl,” or, “The girl is clever, an active girl.” Whenever 
I’d work they’d think I was a girl. A widow doesn’t show herself as being a girl or 
married and doesn’t let the people know her name. They’d say, “Girl, what’s your 
name so we can write you down?” And I’d say, “Hurriyeh”. Each day I’d get a 
qrua of whatever we were harvesting, wheat, barley, lentils, onions. Women used 
to come by my house begging for a head of onion — and my house was full and 
my son was happy — But I never let a man in my house, I never told my brother 
to come and stay or never said oh father let someone stay. I was very scared of 
people’s gossip. There were a lot of women in my position; never anyone brought 
our story up in a bad way
Um Subhi: feeding her kids and sisters
I’d go to the women in Khan Yunis and do any work they’d give me. I’d prepare 
brides, They’d give me some grain or lentils, I’d do laundry, what ever I could 
find. I’d go back and feed my kids and my sisters. All day I’d be working and 
coming and going and not a moment to sit. Then they started making the camps 
and people left to the north to Gaza.
We lived on the beach there in Khan Yunis for three years, not just us – all of 
Hammama was there living in the dunes. Me and my parents and my children 
and sisters and brother. My brother worked fishing and my oldest son who was 
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seven worked with him – they’d get paid in fish. My father was old, too old to 
work. After some time they gave us a tent, after the shack had collapsed on us 
from the rain. Inside the shack we slept on the sand and made pillows from guava 
leaves then when it rained the water would come up through the sand and soak 
everything. Then it rained so hard the shack collapsed. Then they started to make 
the camps and people went north to live in the camps . If you were six people 
you got a bell tent and if you were more you got a big tent. We came here (Shatti 
camp) because all of our relatives were here. My father died in Khan Yunis so I 
came here with my mother and brother. I got a bell tent and my mother got a bell 
tent – each one on their own.
Un Ahmad: a useless tent
The Arctic tent, called parachute by the refugees because they were made of 
nylon was the nemesis of our work… they didn’t have ordinary an door flap 
permitting entry in an upright position but a round tunnel-like snout requiring 
the assumption of an all fours position. Made for soldiers in battle they were 
completely unsuitable for family life.3
From Shujayiyya they put us down by the sea, the Agency. A big family they’d 
get a big tent and the small family would get a parachute tent – that was useless, 
impossible. Down by the sea my son started to cough. He was strong like a horse 
and then he got a fever and was coughing. I took him to get checked and an 
old man,a Bedouin, said to me – get him away from the wet air. My uncle had 
his family by the side of the rail tracks in Jabaliya – between the tracks and the 
asphalt road. I went and stayed with them for four days. And soon enough my 
son was out playing and was like a horse again. I said that’s it – I’ll never go back 
to the camp – I’m raising him here. I left my son with my old Aunt and my uncle 
helped me gather my things and the parachute. And my parents followed and we 
all had our tents there – near the tracks and the fields. 
Then they made Jabaliya camp. We had been paying rent putting the tents in 
people’s fields and then they made the camp. My old aunt came with me – my 
uncle had died so she came with me and looked after the boy while I would go 
out and wash laundry or do weeding, harvesting, doing and doing for a shilling 
on top of getting our rations.
Um Subhi: peddling grapes at dawn
If Gazans were harvesting I’d go there and work for them, four qurush, a shilling 
that’s what we made working on their land. In Hammama I’d harvest for people 
for outsiders — bedouins — not from our village — but here in the hijra this 
is where we got tired and this is where we still are. After this I worked peddling, 
I’d go out from the adan [4 a.m. call to prayer] and come back from Wadi Gaza 
at six in the morning and I’m carrying three boxes of grapes on my head — in a 
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basket they get crushed, I’d sell here in the camp market by the rutl and by the 
half rutl and kilos. Everyday in the heat I’d go down to Wadi Gaza, carry back 
boxes of grapes and stay in the market until I’d sold them all. My mother started 
doing laundry for people in the city. She’d never worked like that for someone 
before. My sister made straw tabaq’s and sold them – she’d beg some straw from 
people and make those trays.. My brothers and sisters were young, my children 
were young we all had to work to feed them. 
Um Ahmad: building houses
Then the Agency started building houses – it was us who built them. We used 
to carry bricks, make houses — each one of those bricks we’d carry them on our 
head. The Agency was building houses, they’d pay the women a shilling — we’d 
work with the men — the men also got a shilling. Everyone worked on that, 
people had nothing, there was no work, only those rations so when there was 
work building everyone built.
Um Subhi: “all of them worked to live”
We came here and lived in a tent and then the Agency said we want to build 
houses. I started working carrying broken shells, the first work I worked here was 
on houses, digging ditches in the ground then transporting water on my head, 
all day I’d be carrying water on my head and filling the ditch, all of the women 
worked in that, with 50 or 60 women with 50 men. You’d plaster, carrying clay, 
women carrying water on their heads. The Agency would pay you two and a half 
qurush — all day carrying on our heads for two qurush. Everyone they worked, 
men and women, all of them worked to live. Life was very hard; there was no 
work and no money — there wasn’t enough work to get money. We worked from 
six to six for two and half qurush or for about a shilling and we were carrying from 
the sea. We built those houses. We’d carry the mud on our heads and the men 
would make them into bricks and then we’d carry them, I’d carry seven and the 
first thing was the walls — the first houses were from clay bricks that the Agency 
built. We built them ourselves. When we’d done each one got a room, one room 
for seven people, eight people in a room. 10 or 12 they’d get two rooms — the 
people with a big family. After we built them of clay bricks, then we women 
would plaster them with clay for two and a half qurush. That was women’s work 
plastering, just like it was back in the village — we’d mix the clay with straw and 
plaster the roof, and put the wood beams and palm fronds and plaster over it with 
clay. We women, our specialty is plastering with mud, and carrying stones and 
we’d carry the water and put it for the men as they made the bricks all day we’d be 
carrying it to the men. Abu Ramadan was the foreman — the Agency told him to 
get workers and he would come round and say, “Who wants to work on building 
houses?” After we made them they gave us our room.
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Um Ahmad: walking to work
Thank God the boy was clever, he was clever in school. I started to work for a 
woman in Gaza, I’d do her laundry, clean her house, make her bread. — she’d 
give me 10 or 20 qurush from her pay. At the adan at four in the morning I’d go 
walking to Shifa [hospital] walking so I could save those coins. I’d go walking and 
come back walking. I worked for an Egyptian nurse, cleaning her house, doing 
her laundry. Her husband was crazy about me — he used to say,”why can’t you 
do this like Um Ahmad?” On top of my pay she’d give me things, some soap or 
shampoo, some clothes.
Um Subhi: always running
I stopped working in agriculture and started fixing brides or doing laundry for 
the city people in Gaza — people from Rimal from the morning until the late 
afternoon and all the day I’d be rubbing with my hands — there weren’t machines 
and I’d rub them until they were white — I’d go home and the skin of my fingers 
would be gone
I’d fix up brides, lighten and beautify them and then I’d go back home and 
there’d be a woman standing there who’d brought me lime so I could lime her 
house for her. The clay that the Agency brought for the houses was black, it was 
dark. After a while women would go and get lime they’d buy it and they’d come 
and say, “Mariam please come and lime my house.” I’d whitewash their house 
for them — two rooms for 10 qurush. That was in the 1950s. I also would sew 
fishing nets, thobes. A thobe was two and a half qurush — for my children to 
feed them. I’d go to a wedding and do the bride so I could feed my children. I 
was always running and doing this bit or that bit — I was tired, exhausted, I’d do 
mattresses for five qurush — everything I did...
Gaza Living on its Capital
Seven years into the refugee experience, in 1955 a UN observer described the 
situation of refugees in Gaza. Despite the efforts of UNRWA and the international 
community, James Baster from the United Nations Secretariat visited the Strip 
and gave this description of “post-war” Gaza: 
The Gaza community is living on its capital — clothing is worn out, livestock 
is killed for food, the need for firewood has de-forested the area, railroad ties are 
stolen for building and carpentry...merchants selling three eggplants and five 
tomatoes, farmers cultivating small fragments of sandy soil, men and women 
bartering manual services for a fragment of a ration — these are the symbols of 
a struggle for life in which there can be little thought for the future.4
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Osama’s Daughters:  
Cultural Racism, Nation-Based Racism, and 
the Intersectionality of Oppressions after 9/11
Nadine Naber
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attack in New York City, 
Arab and Muslim Americans found themselves both the target of 
U.S. government suspicion and repression and also, on occasion, 
community harassment and violence. In a new book edited by 
Amaney Jamal and Nadine Naber, Race and Arab Americans 
Before and After 9/11: From Invisible Subjects to Visible 
Subjects (Syracuse University Press 2008), contributors explore 
the political and cultural dynamics in the construction of an 
imagined “Muslim other/enemy within” and the consequences 
on, and reactions of, Arab-American and other communities. 
In an excerpt from her chapter in the volume, Nadine Naber 
explores the inter-section of race, gender and class in oppressions 
of, and resistance by, Arab-Americans. Of particular interest to 
readers of the Review of Women’s Studies, Naber explores how 
gender operates in the context of this racialized oppression, noting 
that “federal government policies disproportionately targeted 
men while hate crimes and incidents of harassment in the public 
sphere disproportionately targeted women.”  Whether the wearing 
of the hijab, having an Arabic name (Osama’s daughters) or 
displaying Palestinian symbols, women are both targeted and 
resist such harassment. Readers are directed to the full chapter 
in Race and Arab-Americans – entitled “Look Mohammed the 
Terrorist is Coming!” – for Naber’s analysis of the historical 
context, anti-immigration and other discriminatory government 
legislation and an detailed exploration of cultural racism in the 
construction of “Muslim masculinities.” In the excerpt below, we 
include Naber’s summary of the overall argument of her chapter, 
with several excerpts focusing on “names and naming,” where 
names operate as signifiers of Arab/Muslim identity, “unveiling 
the terrorist’s daughter,” which explores the intersection of race 
and gender in the harassment of women who wear the hijab, 
and “nation of origin and the silencing of political dissent,” 
which focuses on harassment of Palestinian activists. 
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Nadine Naber is Assistant Professor in the American Culture Program 
and Women’s Studies Program at the University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor. Along with researchers from the Institute, she is a member of 
the Arab Families Working Group. We thank Nadine and Syracuse 
University Press for permission to publish this article. 
In an October 2006 speech to the National Endowment for Democracy, George 
Bush used the phrase “Islamo-fascism” in defining “the enemy of the nation” in 
“the war on terror.” He argued that “These extremists distort the idea of jihad 
into a call for terrorist murder against Christians and Jews and Hindus and also 
against Muslims from other traditions, who they regard as heretics. The murderous 
ideology of the Islamic radicals is the great challenge of our new century. These 
militants are not just the enemies of America, or the enemies of Iraq, they are the 
enemies of Islam and the enemies of humanity” (Bush 2005). Bush’s spokesman, 
Tony Snow, explained that Bush uses the term “Islamo-fascists” in order to clarify 
that the war on terror does not apply to all or most Muslims, but to tiny factions 
(Nir 2006). Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, Bush has repeatedly claimed 
that “this is not a war against Islam” and that the “war on terror” is a confrontation 
with a particularly militant Islamic ideology. Yet federal government discourses 
coupled with the local and global implementation of the “war on terror” tell a 
different story, a story of an open-ended arbitrary war against a wide range of 
individuals and communities.
This chapter provides a historically situated, ethnographic account of the 
ways in which “the war on terror” took on local form within the particular 
“anthropological location” of Arab immigrant communities in the San Francisco 
Bay Area of California within the first two years following September 11, 2001.1 
I will first explore the ways in which dominant United States discourses on 
“terrorism” and “Islamic fundamentalism” were reproduced within 9/11-related 
immigration policies in California.2
I argue that official federal government policies such as special registration, 
detentions, and deportations have constituted particular subjects as potential 
enemies within the nation, specifically working-class nonresident Muslim im-
migrant men from Muslim majority countries. In this sense, a set of solid and 
fixed signifiers have come to demarcate the “Muslim Other/enemy within” (e.g., 
masculinity, foreignness, and Islam). Yet at the same time, a wide range of sub-
ject positions have been drawn into the “war on terror” through federal govern-
ment policies, including Arab Christians, Iranian Jews, Latinos/as, and Filipinos/
as, women, and queer people, among others, illustrating that dominant U.S. 
discourses on “Islam” and “Muslims” are not only malleable and fluid but are 
arbitrary, fictional, and imaginary at best.3 Here I draw upon Althusser’s (2003, 
51; 1971, 121) definition of “the hailed individual.” He argues that capitalism 
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constitutes us as subjects by “interpellating” us, calling out to us in the way a po-
liceman calls out to someone in the street. Althusser writes, “the hailed individual 
will turn around. By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conver-
sation, he becomes a subject” (1971, 164). As Althusser’s policeman creates a 
subject from the solitary walker in the street, one answerable to the law and to 
the state and system behind it, post-September 11 federal government and media 
discourses have created an arbitrary “potential terrorist” subject intrinsically con-
nected to “Islamic fundamentalism” and “terrorism.”4 I use the term “dominant 
U.S. discourses” to refer to systems of meaning about the “war on terror” pro-
duced among the federal government’s policy makers, the defense industry, the 
corporate media, and neoconservative think tanks (Said 2001, 2002; Doumani 
2006). In the demarcation of boundaries between good versus evil and between 
“those who are with us” and “those who are with the terrorists,” dominant U.S. 
discourses on “terrorism” and “Islamic fundamentalism” have provided “defini-
tions of patriotism, loyalty, boundaries and...belonging” (Said 2002, 578). They 
have also sparked nationalist sentiments that articulate subjects associated with 
“us” as those who are to be protected and those associated with “them” as those 
who are to be disciplined and punished.
I also explore the ways in which dominant U.S. discourses on terrorism were 
reproduced within the context of the post-9/11 backlash in the public sphere 
or in cases of harassment and hate crimes at school, at work, on the bus, and in 
the streets. I argue that the arbitrary, open-ended scope of the domestic “war on 
terror” emerged through the association between a wide range of signifiers such 
as particular names (e.g., Mohammed), dark skin, particular forms of dress (e.g., 
a headscarf or a beard) and particular nations of origin (e.g., Iraq or Pakistan) as 
signifiers of an imagined “Arab/Middle Eastern/Muslim” enemy. In this sense, the 
category “Arab/Middle Eastern/Muslim” operated as a constructed category that 
lumps together several incongruous subcategories (such as Arabs and Iranians, 
including Christians, Jews, and Muslims, and all Muslims from Muslim-majority 
countries, as well as persons who are perceived to be Arab, Middle Eastern, or 
Muslim, such as South Asians, including Sikhs and Hindus.5 Persons perceived to 
be “Arab/Middle Eastern/Muslim” were targeted by harassment or violence based 
on the assumption “they” embody a potential for terrorism and are thus threats 
to U.S. national security and deserving of discipline and punishment. Although 
these markers (name, skin color, dress, and nation of origin) were not the only 
signifiers that hailed individuals into associations with “Islamic fundamentalism” 
or “terrorism,” they were among those most prevalent within my research 
participants’ encounters with the post-9/11 backlash. While these signifiers were 
not mutually exclusive and operated relationally, particular signifiers were more 
salient than others, depending on the person or the situation. For example, in 
some contexts, a name such as Mohammed coupled with a beard signified the 
“Arab/Middle Eastern/Muslim” identity and in other contexts, it was nation of 
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origin coupled with dark skin and a form of dress that signified the “Arab/Middle 
Eastern/Muslim.”
I further argue that the post-9/11 backlash has been constituted by an 
interplay between two racial logics, cultural racism and nation-based racism. I 
refer to “cultural racism” as a process of othering that constructs perceived cultural 
(e.g., Arab), religious (e.g., Muslim), or civilizational (e.g., Arab and/or Muslim) 
differences as natural and insurmountable.6 Here, I build upon Minoo Moallem’s 
analysis of contexts in which religion may be considered “as a key determinant 
in the discourse of racial inferiority” (2005, 10) and Balibar’s argument that 
“race,” when coded as culture, can be constituted by a process that makes no 
reference to claims of biological superiority, but instead associates difference and 
inferiority with spiritual inheritance (1992, 25). In such instances, “culture can 
also function like a nature, and it can in particular function as a way of locking 
individuals and groups a priori into a genealogy, into a determination that is 
immutable and intangible in origin” (Balibar 1992, 22). As in European histories 
of anti-Semitism, histories of Islamophobia have deployed biological features 
in the racialization process. In this analysis, as in European histories of anti-
Semitism, biological features are deployed, but “within the framework of cultural 
racism” (Balibar 1992, 22).7 In other words, bodily stigmata become signifiers 
of a spiritual inheritance as opposed to a biological heredity (Balibar 1992, 22). 
In the context of my research, the term “cultural racism” refers to cases in which 
violence or harassment was justified on the basis that persons who were perceived 
to be “Arab/Middle Eastern/Muslim” were rendered as inherently connected to a 
backward, inferior, and potentially threatening Arab culture, Muslim religion, or 
Arab Muslim civilization.
I use the term “nation-based racism” to refer to the construction of particular 
immigrants as different than and inferior to whites based on the conception that 
“they” are foreign and therefore embody a potentiality for criminality and/or 
immorality and must be “evicted, eliminated, or controlled.”8 In the context of 
the “war on terror,” the interplay between culture-based racism and nation-based 
racism has articulated subjects perceived to be “Arab/Middle Eastern/Muslim” 
not only as a moral, cultural, and civilizational threat to the “American” nation, 
but also as a security threat. The mapping of cultural racism onto nation-based 
racism has been critical in generating support for the idea that going to war “over 
there” and enacting racism and immigrant exclusion “over here” are essential to 
the project of protecting national security. Under the guise of a “war on terror,” 
cultural and nation-based racism have operated transnationally to justify U.S. 
imperialist ambitions and practices as well as the targeting and profiling of persons 
perceived to be “Arab/Middle Eastern/Muslim” in the diaspora.9
Throughout my field sites, “racism” did not operate as a separate, mutually 
exclusive, axis of power. Rather, it intersected with multiple axes of oppression, 
such as class, gender, and sexuality. According to Linda Burnham, the idea of 
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a simultaneity of oppressions “emerged among women of color feminists in 
fierce contention with the notion that racial identity trumps all other identities 
and that the struggle against racism should take precedence over all other forms 
of resistance to inequity” (2001, 9). My research illustrates that intersections 
between race, class, gender, and sexuality produced a range of engagements with 
“racism” among my research participants, depending on their social positioning. 
For example, the reproduction of government policies and media discourses in 
day-to-day interactions at work, on the bus, or on the streets were more violent 
and life threatening in working class urban locations than in upper-middle-class 
locations (Naber 2006). Because of their class privilege and the longer duration 
in which they had been in the United States, middle to upper-class research 
participants had access to social, cultural, and economic privileges that allowed 
them to distance themselves from proximity to the “potential terrorists” compared 
to their working-class counterparts. Alternately, working-class immigrants were 
often perceived to be in closer proximity to “geographies of terror” (i.e., Muslim-
majority nations) and were therefore perceived to be in closer proximity to the 
“potential terrorists” than their middle-class counterparts.10
 Throughout my field site, socioeconomic class intersected with race and gender 
in that dominant discourses tended to construct working-class masculinities 
as agents of terrorism and working-class femininities as passive victims of “the 
terrorists.” I use the term “internment of the psyche” to refer to the ways in which 
engagements with racialization produced a sense of internal incarceration among 
my research participants that was emotive and manifested in the fear that at any 
moment, one could be harassed, beaten up, picked up, locked up, or disappeared 
(Naber 2006).
Research Methods
This essay is based on ethnographic research among Arab immigrants and Arab 
Americans in the San Francisco Bay Area between September 2002 and September 
2003. Most of the research took place among two Arab/Arab American community 
networks, one that includes recent Arab Muslim immigrants and refugees from 
Iraq, Yemen, Palestine, and North Africa living in poverty and the other, middle 
and upper-class professionals who are predominantly first and second generation 
and include Muslims and Christians from the Levant. The research entailed 
intensive interviews and participant observation with thirty board members 
representing eight religious, civil rights, and community-based organizations that 
serve Arabs/Arab Americans among their constituencies.11 I conducted intensive 
interviews with six lawyers whose work was vital to community-based efforts in 
response to the anti-Arab/South Asian/Muslim backlash in the San Francisco Bay 
Area in the aftermath of September 11.12 I also conducted intensive interviews 
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and participant observation among fifty community members from various class, 
generational, and religious backgrounds and various countries of origin in the 
Arab world.
Names and Naming: “Look, Mohammed  
the Terrorist Is Coming!”
Repeatedly throughout my research, participants’ narratives on harassment in the 
public sphere were stories in which particular names operated as signifiers of an 
“Arab/Middle Eastern/Muslim” identity. Teachers and youth group leaders agreed 
that boys with names such as Mohammed or Osama were disproportionately 
harassed at school. Consider the following stories. Nayla, a Muslim American 
youth group leader, recalled an incident where school kids would frequently 
shout, “Look, Mohammed the terrorist is coming!” when a young boy named 
Mohammed would enter the playground. Amira, a college student, recalled 
reading the words, “I hate Mohammed. All Mohammeds should die,” on 
a wall outside the Recreation and Sports Facilities Building at the University 
of California, Berkeley. Reflecting on difficulties that he and his wife faced in 
deciding whether or not to name their son Mohammed, Saleh, a small business 
owner, explained: “After September 11 no one would have thought about naming 
their son Mohammed in this country if they wanted him to be treated like a 
normal person. We thought about what would happen to our son in school, and 
how he would be discriminated against growing up. But we felt that this is our 
religion and our culture, and long before September 11 we decided that if we had 
a second son, we would name him Mohammed. We decided not to change what 
we stood for, but imagine what happens when your neighbor says, ‘what is that 
cute little boy’s name?’ You say ‘Mohammed’ and they say, ‘Oh...’ This is how 
September 11 impacted even the relationship between you and your neighbor.”
Several Christian Arabs and Arab Americans with whom I interacted were 
similarly targeted based on associations between their name and the notion of 
a “potential enemy of the nation.” In such cases, Christians were perceived to 
be Muslim because they had Arabic names, illustrating the ways that federal 
government and corporate media discourses that conflate the categories “Arab” 
and “Muslim” take on local form in the public sphere. A youth group leader at 
a Roman Catholic Arab American church reported that after their son Osama 
was repeatedly called “Muslim terrorist,” his parents changed his name to 
“Sam.” Recurring throughout the period of my research were similar stories of 
individuals who changed their Arabic names to anglicized names, including an 
Arab American Christian who changed his name from Fouad to Freddy after 
facing 9/11-related harassment. Misidentifications of Arab Christians as Muslims 
reify the absurd generalizations and misconceptions underlying hegemonic 
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constructions of the category “Arab” or “Muslim.” They also reify that encounters 
with racism are informed by fiction and comprise a wide variety of complexities 
and contradictions. As Amitava Kumar puts it, “In those dark chambers, what 
is revealed always hides something else” (2000, 74). In the cases of misidentified 
Arab Christians, the simple reality that not all Arabs are Muslim and not all 
Muslims are Arabs is hidden and erased from history.
Like federal government legislation, harassment against “potential terrorist 
men” in the public sphere operated within the logic of nation-based racism that 
considers discipline and punishment the “proper mechanism to set the tide of 
criminality intrinsic to them” (Ono and Sloop 2002, 33). Nation-based racism is 
not specific to the post-9/11 environment, but it has been critical to the justification 
of many cases of immigrant exclusion by the idea that citizens should be protected 
against “others” who are “potentially or already criminal” (33), or in this case, 
terrorists. Ono and Sloop argue that the post-Cold War period has witnessed 
a proliferation of the notion of the enemy of the nation and that discourse is 
constituted by the idea that “enemies threaten the moral, cultural, and political 
fabric of the nation state and must be evicted, eliminated, or controlled....The 
production and proliferation of new enemies to blame, to oppose, and to conquer 
is part of a distinct contemporary culture” (35). Referring to histories of Asian 
immigrant exclusion, Lisa Lowe (1994, 55) writes that nation-based racism has 
operated through the construction of a binary opposition between patriot and 
enemy. After 9/11, in the process of legitimizing imperialist ambitions through 
appeals to nationalist narratives about protecting national security, dominant U.S. 
discourses have refashioned post-Cold War binaries from patriot versus enemy to 
those who are with us versus those who are with the terrorists.13 Names signifying 
an “Arab/Middle Eastern/Muslim” identity rendered particular men and boys 
at once foreign, or alien, to the nation, but at the same time connected, in the 
most familial and instinctive terms, to “the terrorists.” In this sense, nation-based 
racism conflates “Arab/Middle Eastern/Muslim” masculinities with an inherent 
potential for violence and terrorism and legitimizes the discipline and punishment 
of “Arab/Middle Eastern/Muslim” masculinities “over there” (in the countries the 
United States is invading) and “over here” (within the geographic borders of the 
U.S.). Moreover, that Saleh, in the narrative above, reconsidered whether to name 
his son Mohammed indicates that he came to understand that he was required 
to engage with the hegemonic conflation of names such as Mohammed with 
Muslim masculinity and terrorism. In this sense, the interpellation of subjects 
through hegemonic discourses produced disciplinary effects in them. While the 
conflation of the “Arab/Middle Eastern/Muslim” and “terrorism” brought into 
play dualistic mechanisms of exclusion (patriot vs. enemy/with us or against us), 
it simultaneously induced within individuals a state of consciousness that I refer 
to as “internment of the psyche” (Naber 2006).
Although gender permeated nation-based racism through the conflation of 
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particular names with Muslim masculinity and terrorism, a mapping of nation-
based racism onto cultural racism also operated to articulate “Arab/Middle 
Eastern/Muslim” masculinity as inherently violent toward women. One cab 
driver told a story of his passengers’ reaction to him after they read that his name 
was Mohammed: “Once, a woman got in my car. She looked at me, then read my 
name, then asked me if I was Muslim. When I said ‘yes’ she replied, ‘how many 
girls have you killed today?’” In this case, a form of cultural racism that essentializes 
Muslimness as if the association between violence against women and Muslim 
masculinity is natural and insurmountable constitutes the articulation of Muslim 
masculinity as intrinsically connected to misogynist savagery. The woman’s 
reaction to the cab driver reifies what Moallem refers to as “representations of 
Islamic fundamentalism in the West” that are “deeply influenced by the general 
racialization of Muslims in a neo-racist idiom which has its roots in cultural 
essentialism and a conventional Eurocentric notion of people without history.”
Here, “religion” functions like a nature (Balibar 1999, 22), as “Mohammed,” 
like the Osama and Fouad references above, becomes monstrously subversive, a 
metonymic source of sedition and danger within the nation, as well as to U.S. 
“interests” and to “American” bodies, white and nonwhite.
Unveiling the Terrorist’s Daughter
The intersection of race and gender was also apparent in the harassment of 
women who wore a headscarf. A general consensus among community leaders 
was that federal government policies disproportionately targeted men while 
hate crimes and incidents of harassment in the public sphere disproportionately 
targeted women. As Farah, a Muslim American woman community activist put it, 
“Women who wear hijab were more of a target because they’re more visible than 
Muslim men in public. The awareness that they were in more danger and were 
more impacted than men could be seen by all of the events that were organized 
in solidarity with veiled women in response to the backlash. There were days of 
solidarity organized across the nation.” Several cases in which employers fired 
women from their jobs for wearing headscarves instilled a sense of apprehension 
about the acceptability of discrimination against Muslim women in the public 
sphere among several of my research participants. As Manal, a university student 
explained, “We felt supported, but at the same time, there was a concern for 
our safety. I had never carried pepper spray. I started carrying pepper spray after 
9/11 and was really being mindful of my surroundings. I remember the Muslim 
Student Association meetings; afterwards everyone would make sure that no one 
was walking alone to their cars.” Several Muslim American community leaders 
recalled cases in which women debated whether they should remove their scarves. 
As Amal, another university student put it, “I knew I had to prepare for at least 
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some kind of backlash because I was visually identifiable. My mother, who 
doesn’t cover, specifically told me ‘Don’t go outside for a month or two. Wait till 
things die down.’ I was like, ‘I shouldn’t hide. I shouldn’t be scared or restrain my 
lifestyle because of ignorance.’” In this sense, considerations of whether and to 
what extent one should wear or remove a headscarf or go out in public generated 
an “internment of the psyche” or the awareness that one must become habitually 
concerned about hegemonic misinterpretations and mistranslations.
While “Arab Muslim” masculinities were produced as the subjects of discourses 
that construct their primary and stable identity as violent agents of terrorism and/
or misogyny, or the “true” enemy of the nation, “Arab Muslim” femininities, 
signified by the headscarf, were articulated as extensions of those practices.14 
In several cases, that headscarves signified an identification that transformed 
particular women into daughters or sisters of terrorists in general, or Osama or 
Saddam in particular, exemplifies one of the ways in which gender permeated 
nation-based racism in the context of the “war on terror.” Lamia, a community 
activist summarized what she witnessed through her work among Arab Muslim 
youth in the Tenderloin, “After September 11, girls who wear hijab received lots 
of harassment on the bus, at school and on the street. People would try and pull 
their hijab off.” The following excerpt from a group interview with Iraqi youth 
elucidates Lamia’s point:
Maha: “My sister was coming home from school one day and people 
were calling her, ‘Osama’s daughter.’”
Salma: “At school, kids take off their shirts and put them on their heads 
and say, ‘We look like Osama’s daughter now. We look like you now.’ Some 
kids would come up to us and say, ‘Why don’t you take it off? Are you still 
representing Osama?’”
In this narrative, young Arab Muslim girls are constructed as though patriarchal 
kinship ties are the sole determinants of their identities. Reduced to “daughters 
of Osama,” they are transformed into the “property,” “the harmonious extension” 
(Shohat and Stam 1994) of the enemy of the nation within, or symbols that 
connect others to the “real actors” or “terrorists” but who do not stand on their 
own (and lack agency). The “daughter of a terrorist” metaphor also articulates 
a condemnation of Muslim women for veiling.15 Reifying the logic of nation-
based racism that constructs a binary between us versus them and good, or moral 
Americans versus bad immoral potential criminal terrorists, Salma’s peer not only 
asks her to “unveil” but also reduces her realm of possibilities to either “taking off 
her veil” or “representing Osama.” For Salma’s peer, either she is unveiled/with 
us, or she is with terrorism. In this sense, the “veil” serves as a boundary marker 
between “us” and “them,” and as long as women remain “veiled” they remain 
intrinsically connected to “potential terrorists.”
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Nation of Origin and the Silencing of Political Dissent
My research indicated that emblems signifying particular nations of origin also 
placed persons into associations with the “potential terrorist” enemy of the 
nation. This process was based upon a logic that conflated particular nations 
with “Arabness,” “Islam,” and a potentiality for “terrorism.” The signifier “nation 
of origin” often intersected with other emblems signifying the “Arab/Middle 
Eastern/Muslim” (such as name, skin color, facial hair, or headscarf ). In particular, 
emblems representing “geographies of terror,” or the nations that the Bush 
administration has referred to as terrorist-harboring countries or terrorist training 
grounds (e.g., Palestine or Iraq), tended to operate as signifiers of the enemy 
of the nation. Moreover, the potential for encountering harassment was often 
exacerbated when one was perceived to be an “Arab/Middle Eastern/Muslim” 
simultaneously expressed solidarity with one or more of these nations. For 
example, Zainab, a Palestinian woman who wore a kuffiyah (a scarf representing 
Palestinian resistance) on a daily basis and posted a sticker of a Palestinian flag on 
a window near the front door of her home encountered some of the most severe 
forms of harassment I learned of throughout the period of my research. Zainab 
lived in the Mission District of San Francisco. She described her experience as 
follows: “I walked out [our door] and saw all this graffiti. I didn’t know....Should 
I be afraid? angry? Then I looked at the sidewalk and saw ‘Kill Arabs’ in big 
blocks right in front of our house.”16
For Zainab, the “war on terror” took on local form in that her public expression 
of Palestinian identity and political solidarity with Palestinian people put her in 
close proximity with the “terrorists.” The perpetrator’s articulation of violence 
against Zainab paralleled the Bush administration’s rhetoric that violence is 
essential to patriotism, Americanness, and the protection of national security in 
the context of the “war on terror.” In the ongoing hate crimes that took place 
in the two-year period following 9/11, vandalism and death threats emerged as 
critical venues for the articulation of nation-based racism against persons who 
were perceived to be intrinsically associated with “Islamic fundamentalism” and 
“terrorism” in the public sphere. Perpetrators deployed tactics “officially” banned 
by the state that simultaneously supported government discourses on militarized 
patriotism and war against the enemies of the nation in this case, Palestinian 
Arabs.
Conclusion
In this chapter I seek to bring new questions to bear on the study of race and racism 
within U.S. racial and ethnic studies: What are the implications of continually 
reevaluating our understanding of racialized-gendered identities in light of new 
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and changing historical moments? What are the possibilities for envisioning U.S. 
racial and ethnic studies in ways that remain connected to the 1960s student 
and civil rights struggles through which they were produced while becoming 
more attentive to current gendered racialization processes? How might becoming 
attentive to the gendered racialization of Arabs, South Asians, and/or Muslims 
contribute to explorations of the relationship between race, gender, sexuality, and 
empire or the structures of racism, sexism, and homophobia that operate against 
immigrants with whose homelands the United States is at war?
This chapter has reinforced existing theoretical approaches that tend to 
define U.S. race and ethnic studies that contend that “race” is malleable and 
shifting, that racial categories are socially and historically constructed, and that 
the construction of racial categories is a continuous process that takes on new 
and different form within different historical moments. It has also affirmed 
existing women of color feminist approaches that have called attention to 
differences within racialized groups (such as those of class, gender, sexuality, and 
religion) and contended that experiences of oppression that are shaped by both 
racism and sexism simultaneously cannot be subsumed within either a feminist 
framework that critiques sexism or an antiracist framework that is only critical of 
racism (Crenshaw 1991). 17 It has also illustrated that research on the gendered 
racialization of the “Middle Eastern/Muslim” or the “Arab/Muslim/South Asian” 
“enemy within” can generate important new questions, such as: To what extent 
does the rhetoric of an endless, fluid “war or terror” that “knows no boundaries” 
produce new forms of gendered racialization that are similarly arbitrary, open-
ended, and transgress borders and particular geographic places?
Endnotes
1 Here I use Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson’s term “anthropological locations.” They define such 
“location work” as “an attentiveness to social, cultural, and political location and a willingness to 
work self-consciously at shifting or realigning our own location while building epistemological 
and political links with other locations” (1997)
2 Here I build upon Andrea Smith’s notion of “racial logics.” She argues against the assumption 
that all communities have been impacted by white supremacy in the same way. Instead, white 
supremacy operates through separate yet still related racial logics. Multiple logics operate 
depending on the context: “This framework does not assume that racism and white supremacy 
is enacted in a singular fashion; rather, white supremacy is constituted by separate and distinct, 
but still interrelated, logics (2006, 67).
3 See Moallem (2002) for further analysis of discourses on “Islamic fundamentalism.” She 
argues, for example, that discourses on “Islamic fundamentalism...[reduce] all Muslims to 
fundamentalists, and all fundamentalists to fanatical anti-modern traditionalists and terrorists, 
even as it attributes a culturally aggressive and oppressive nature to all fundamentalist men, and 
a passive, ignorant, and submissive nature to all fundamentalist women.
4 Here I use Kent Ono’s term, “potential terrorists.” Ono argues that “potential terrorists” serves 
as a useful concept to begin to address political and media discourses that produce a creative, 
if fictional, ‘network’ or interconnection along racial, gender, national, sexual, political, 
and ideological lines. Hate crimes, surveillance by the repressive apparatus of the state, and 
surveillance and disciplining technologies have erected a powerful discursive barrier to full 
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participation in society by those marked as ‘potential terrorist’” (2005, 443).
5  The category “Arab/Middle Eastern/Muslim” as a signifier of the “enemy of the nation” was 
not produced after 9/11 but has permeated government and corporate media discourses for 
decades. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the subcategory “South Asian” has been 
encompassed within dominant U.S. discourses on the “Arab/Middle Eastern/Muslim” enemy 
(Rana and Rosas 2006; Maira and Shihade 2006). Federal government policies, for example, 
tended particularly to target Arabs and South Asians, and hate crime incidents following 9/11 
throughout the U.S. disproportionately targeted Arabs and South Asians, illustrating that Arabs 
and South Asians have been similarly associated with “Islamic fundamentalism,” “terrorism,” 
and the “enemy of the nation” in the context of the “war on terror.” Because my research did 
not include a focus on South Asian communities, I will focus specifically on how Arab and 
Arab American research participants were perceived to be associated with the notion of an 
“Arab/Middle Eastern/Muslim” enemy, even though this term has taken on different form in 
other contexts.
6 See Moallem (2005), Balibar (1991), and Goldberg (1993).
7 See Stockton (1994), Rana and Rosas (2006), and Moallem (2005) for further analysis of 
cultural racism and the relationship between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Moallem, for 
example, argues that “this imputation of an intrinsic nature to a cultural or religious system has 
roots in European race theory, in particular, in the discourse of anti-Semitism” (10).
8 Although the construction of an Arab Muslim Other has permeated dominant U.S. 
national discourses for decades, it became increasingly pronounced and expanded in scope 
in the aftermath of September 11 (Ono and Sloop 2002, 35). See Abraham (1989), Joseph 
(1999), Saliba (1999), and Suleiman (1989) for analyses of the history of Arab American 
marginalization.
9 See Robert Young for further analysis of the concept of “imperialism” (2001, 25-24). Also see 
Harvey (2003), who maintains that the New Imperialism represents U.S. efforts to resort to 
military power in the process of controlling the world’s oil resources and to ensure continued 
U.S. dominance in the global arena. Also see Rashid Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire for a historical 
analysis of Western intervention and empire in the Middle East (2004).
10 Here I build upon Tadiar’s theorization of racism in the context of the “war on terror.” She 
argues, “from the dominant cultural logic of the U.S. state, terrorism embodies an other relation 
to death, and it is on this basis that racism operates against other peoples who are deemed close 
to this other relation to death epitomized by the would be suicide bomber” (2005).
11 I selected organizations that have played key roles in responding to the post-September 11 
backlash, attracted the most members, and have the greatest membership size. I also selected 
organizations that were diverse, focusing on a range of issues that were educational, religious, 
cultural, and political and serving persons from various generations, socioeconomic class 
backgrounds, and countries or origin within the Arab world.
12 The lawyers who participated in this research worked on a wide range of issues and projects in 
solidarity with Arab and Muslim immigrant communities on a day-to-day basis. One lawyer, for 
example, was the co-chair of the Bay Area Arab American Attorneys Association and served via 
mayoral appointment on the San Francisco Human Rights Commission. The program director 
at the San Francisco Bay Area chapter of the National Lawyers Guild also participated in this 
research and helped to develop a “Know Your Rights” campaign. Several lawyers worked closely 
with special registration cases. Another lawyer helped organize a project that documented and 
organized project that monitored INS abuses in the city of San Francisco. A lawyer who was 
appointed as the Human Rights Commissioner of the city of San Francisco and participated 
in this research also organized a series of hearings where individuals targeted by the post-9/11 
backlash narrated and recorded their stories.
13 See Howell and Shryock (2003) for further analysis on the implications of the binary “those who 
are with us and those who are with terrorists” on Arab American identities and experiences.
14 For further analysis on representations of femininity as extensions of masculinity, “abject 
beings,” or the construction of the feminine as objects that supply the site through which the 
phallus penetrates, see Butler (1993). Also see Tadiar (2002, 5) for a discussion of the ways 
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that women within a colonialist, patriarchal society are not only imprisoned within particular 
ideals about gender, but also function as useful objects that serve patriarchal, national, and 
international structures and processes.
15 See Shohat and Stam for an analysis of colonialist discourses on “veiling.” Ella Shohat and 
Robert Stam, in their critique of colonialist Hollywood films write, “The orient is...sexualized 
through the recurrent figure of the veiled woman, whose mysterious inaccessibility, mirroring 
that of the orient itself, requires Western unveiling to be understood” (1994, 149).
16  With very little assistance from the local police, Zainab and her friend discovered who the 
perpetrator was by tape recording him in action. She discovered he lived a block away from her 
home. She continued to face resistance from the local police to put a restraining order on him 
or assist her with the case.
17 I draw from Kimberly Crenshaw’s work on intersectionality. She argues that women of 
color often have to choose between participation in an antiracist movement or a feminist 
movement, yet the experiences of women of color mark intersections that cannot be captured 
only by a gender or race analysis that stand separate from each other. Crenshaw’s work on the 
intersectionality transgresses this limitation by opening up a space for intersectional organizing/
resistance (1991).
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Addressing Violence against Palestinian Women, an Initial 
Intervention.”
Eileen Kuttab is an Assistant Professor of Sociology and the former 
Director of the Institute of Women’s Studies.
Introduction
For the last two decades, it has become more difficult or even unrealistic to de-link 
the global setting from the political, economic and social conditions of the Middle 
East in general and the occupied Palestinian Territories in particular. The recent 
changes and challenges that face the Middle East can only be viewed in the context 
of globalization or what some call the “Empire.” As Petras stated, the concept of 
Empire is “the process that encapsulates the world of multi-nationals, the global 
military apparatus and international financial institutions linked structurally to the 
“Imperial state” (Petras, 1997). Reviewing the political and economic changes in 
the past decades, one can say safely that the Empire’s hegemony over the regional or 
local contexts cannot happen in a vacuum or without the support of internal local 
or national forces as we observe in different areas of the Middle East. 
At the same time, Hardt and Negi emphasizes the hegemonic nature of the 
Empire but characterized it as borderless and eternal, which gives the impression 
that it has been created to stay and hence assumes coping as a necessity and resistance 
as meaningless. They describe it as:
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“fundamentally lacking boundaries, where its rule has no limits and where it 
posits a regime that effectively encompasses the spatial totality, or really that 
rules over the entire “civilized” world… In other words, Empire presents 
its rule not as a transitory moment in the movement of history, but as a 
regime with no temporal boundaries and in this sense outside of history or 
at the end of history. It operates on all registers of the social order extending 
down to the depths of the social world. Empire not only manages a territory 
and a population but also creates the very world it inhabits.” (Hardt, Negi, 
2001). 
 
It is difficult to ignore the effect of such a political paradigm, where unchecked 
military supremacy and economic power creates a culture of submission and fear 
that national and local regimes cannot compete with or challenge, hence choose 
to cooperate and be co-opted as the only way to cope and share its economic 
benefits.
However, on another level, such a hegemonic position can create a kind of 
challenge where the oppressed and anti-imperial activists develop new modes of 
coping and resistance. What kind of resistance has developed,if any, is not the 
subject of this article, but would be an inspiring analysis to renounce the eternity 
of the Empire
Non-Military Tools: Peace Initiatives and Aid
New conditions emerged in Palestine at the beginning of the nineties when peace 
negotiations started between Israelis and Palestinians, and opened the way for the 
domination of neo- liberal paradigms, where, most strikingly, the Israeli colonial 
occupation on Palestinian territories used “peace” initiatives or negotiations as a 
tool for subjugation. In addition, multinational corporations and other actors acted 
to regulate the future economies of the Middle East and in particular the Palestinian 
territories. For example, the World Bank conducted their first overall study on the 
different sectors of the society like economy, education, the private sector and so on 
to be able to design a comprehensive plan for financing the “peace” initiative. This 
in itself initiated the process of linking structurally global markets with the local 
markets in an uneven, incompatible and exploitive relationship. 
Nevertheless, as was previously mentioned, these global political and economic 
schemes cannot sustain or succeed without the help and support of the internal 
forces of the national regimes and/or the local elite being an integral part, or an 
extension of the new ideological liberal frameworks. The Palestinian local elite, 
like other Arab counterparts, represents interests of small groups of nationals who 
employed political space to develop their personal agendas and portfolios that does 
not in any way include or reflect people’s aspirations, or achieve people’s democratic 
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and national rights. These conditions have been created in the early nineties, after 
the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles of 19931 and the 1995 Interim 
Agreement (the Oslo agreements), which were the “Israelization” of a global model 
which became the framework for all political and economic negotiations and 
practices. It is after, a few years of translating the agreements into practice that they 
became exposed and consequences felt. These practices became more tangible when 
further restrictions were put on mobility of people and goods, and new re-invasions 
of the territories by the Israeli army was carried out which in turn impacted the 
economic life of citizens, increased the levels of unemployment and poverty, and 
deepened the fragmentation of people and regions in addition to exposing the 
Palestinian Authority which could not declare or claim any sovereignty or control 
over the territories. 
A New Style of Dependency and Hegemony 
Currently, the different partners2 in the new “Empire” have come together under 
the slogan of democratic reform and economic prosperity in the Middle East, but 
choosing wars and devastation as the main mechanisms. These physical wars did 
not only invade the economies, markets and territories or lands, but also raided 
and assaulted homes, families, schools, national libraries and museums destroying 
civilization, heritage, culture, memory, and hope. The wars in Palestine, Iraq and 
Lebanon illustrate a real expression of this new Empire and hegemony on the region, 
where a “New Middle East”3 is being re-shaped, A Middle East that is subjugated 
to oppression, humiliation and alienation, with the support and coverage of the 
national political regimes. A region where the global economies substitutes the local 
genuine initiatives in development, where resistance against colonial occupation 
becomes illegitimate, and where state terrorism becomes justifiable and praised by 
the international community and considered as a legitimate tool for security and 
democracy. 
Although the “Empire” has promised the nations to end poverty, unemployment, 
famine, and gender inequality, through economic and political reform and structural 
adjustment policies, to empower the poor and the women, and to enhance human 
and sustainable development, they have failed to do so as their promises have not 
been genuine, and their real agendas rest on further deprivation, dependency and 
added control over resources. The neo-liberals have not invaded the Middle East to 
bring democracy but to cause chaos, destruction fragmentation, cantonization and 
despair. They have limited the social democratic movements’ capacity to challenge 
their model, they have subverted and diffused their efforts through creating and 
cushioning the NGOs to substitute and promote a community in a human face 
(Petras, 1993), transforming class politics to community development, depoliticizing 
active sectors of the population and undermining the commitment to public good 
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through creating technocrats and co-opting potential leaders. They have developed 
programs that provide limited services to narrow groups of communities, programs 
that have become accountable to overseas donors instead of their own people and 
transformed internal solidarity and unity into collaboration and subordination to 
the macro-economy of neo-liberalism through exploitation of the local human and 
material resources. 
It is difficult to de-link the current situation in the Palestinian territories from all 
the above emerging issues. This evolution has developed due to several internal 
factors including the political vacuum created by the post-Oslo weakening of the 
democratic parties and mass-based organization; partisan politics and the short-
sighted vision and dogmatic culture which existed in both the weak “Left” political 
parties and the fragmented and self-centered “Right” parties, all occurring within 
deteriorating economic conditions and poverty. All this has generated a new style 
of organizations that have drifted away from a genuine developmental women’s 
agenda.
Transformation of Palestinian Women’s Organizations
The Palestinian women’s movement in general and women organizations in 
particular have evolved within the different historical stages of the national struggle 
to express people’s aspirations and respond to national needs. Since the beginning 
of the last century, Palestinian women’s activism has been influenced by its relation 
to and identification with the national resistance struggle. For the purpose of this 
paper, I will focus briefly on the seventies and eighties as a background section in 
order to situate the current changes in perspective. 
Characterizing the contemporary women’s movement, one can talk about two 
distinct periods: the first is pre-Oslo period characterized by a revolutionary style in 
the seventies and eighties that featured a genuine democratic movement emerging 
in its decentralized structures to respond to the needs of the national struggle and 
to promote women’s consciousness around national and women’s issues. 
In the mid-seventies, the Palestinian national leadership initiated a process of 
democratization of the national movement in order to mobilize and organize people 
of different social categories including the youth, women, workers and peasants, 
to face the Israeli occupation policies. They believed that resistance should take a 
new form, decentralized mass-based structures that enable the national movement 
to organize the masses, in order to challenge the series of economic and political 
measures implemented by the Israeli occupation intending to destroy the cultural 
and socio-economic infrastructure of the Palestinian society. (Kuttab, 1996) It is in 
this context that the “new” women’s movement represented by women’s decentralized 
outreach committees rather than women’s urban societies were created and a new 
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platform was put forward. The buildup of such democratic activism prepared the 
grounds for a democratic Intifada launched in 1987 which has been characterized 
as one of the major popular uprisings in the recent Palestinian history.
The First Intifada, 1987-1993
After a decade of mobilization and democratization, the women’s movement 
through its continuous work with women in villages and refugee camps represented 
the backbone of the resistance movement in the first Intifada in 1987, when they, 
together with other mass based organizations, acted as the local authority by offering 
their services and support to the people to sustain the community in crisis. 
A new platform was formed that combined different dimensions, most 
importantly national, social, cultural and economic aspects including women’s 
issues. The women’s committees adopted a comprehensive development paradigm 
that not only addressed the national issues, but also all other issues of the community. 
Although the gender discourse was not yet adopted, the committees focused on 
women’s rights and defined them specifically as the right to struggle, to work, to 
be educated and to be represented equally in political decision-making. These 
rights have been and are still legitimate rights that are still part of the women’s 
agenda today. Yet, the content of these rights, their definitions and their meanings 
differed from how these are defined today due to the changing political context and 
the hampering of the donor community and international organizations, which 
replaced the original discourse with a modernizing liberal discourse that targeted 
individual women rather than the collective. The women’s committees played a 
major role in the first Intifada; they have raised political consciousness of women 
through mobilization, organization, and participation in the struggle, they have 
enhanced national production to substitute and boycott Israeli products in an effort 
to enhance national identity. They have created an alternative space for popular 
education to replace regular schools which have been closed by the Occupation 
forces for long periods of time during the Intifada. They have provided services for 
the community in order to sustain the Intifada and support women’s role in public 
life. All these activities have been crucial for the continuity of the Intifada and the 
empowerment of women. (Kuttab 1996).
Post Oslo 1993-2000
The signing of the Oslo agreement created on one hand an initial political 
environment of euphoria and optimism among the Palestinians and a new mode 
of thinking that assumed liberation and independence. Yet, on the other hand, it 
caused a deep split within the national movement which was unified against the 
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occupation. This new mindset, where people felt less pressured by the daily presence 
of the occupiers, created more space to focus on the internal affairs. In this context, 
the women’s movement also found itself urged to look strategically at women’s issues 
and overlook the national issues. Consequently, the mass based organizations have 
become confused and their roles weakened which resulted in their gradual erosion. 
The erosion of these organizations in the transitional period left an elite leadership 
that is not accountable to any constituency — but rather sought legitimacy from 
“the people” through its symbolic and historic role as guardians and representatives 
of the Palestinian people. Furthermore, the fragile left opposition parties have not 
been able to maintain their activity and viability, incapacitated by their own internal 
conflicts and structural weaknesses, particularly the absence of internal democracy, 
as well as the growing hegemony of the Palestinian Authority. Only the Islamist 
opposition has succeeded in maintaining a popular base (Johnson and Kuttab, 
2001) and the last elections of 2006 which resulted in the victory of Hamas the 
Islamic movement indicate this fact.
The nascent “state” has thus transformed the terrain of politics and resistance, 
diminishing the avenues of participation of people in general and women in 
particular, as informal and popular networks of resistance collapsed and were 
substituted with formal politics, and the “inside leadership” of the West Bank and 
Gaza marginalized by “outside” leadership coming from Tunis which resulted in 
a duality between strong formal political activity versus weak informal activity as 
a first step in alienating the civil society and limiting the participation of women. 
(ibid. 2001) This has resulted in the monopoly of the public space by the Authority 
and particularly by its security forces, despite the occasional emergence of “counter-
publics” (Marshall 1994, 144) where political and social issues were contested.
Consequently, a more liberal feminist fragmented movement has been shaped 
compromising on national issues, co-opting neo-liberal paradigms, outward looking- 
using global frameworks as reference to formulate their own agendas, and detached, 
loosing their organic structural ties with the national movement and grass-roots. 
Hence loosing its original national, and class identity, internal homogeneity and 
genuine dynamism. A movement that became keener to reproduce the international 
alienating agenda instead of a responsive relevant local agenda. 
Al Aqsa Intifada, 2000-
In every stage of the struggle women in general and the women’s movement in 
particular faces new challenges, some of them have been directly related to the 
national conflict and the prolonged occupation, while the others have been a result 
of the patriarchal authority and culture of both the national movement and the 
Palestinian society. As the second Intifada was more of a militant nature and women 
did not play an important role in it, the women’s movement has lost it connection 
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with the grassroots due to their limited access to mobility as a result of the closure 
policy that the Occupation enforced, and as a consequence of its irrelevant agenda 
in regard to the rea conditions that emerged as a result of the Intifada. We witness 
separation between the regions: Gaza and West Bank, with aduality in commitment 
to the national issue. We observe a gap between the women’s leadership and grass-
roots, the government was inserted between the mass of the population and the 
occupation, and a corrupt system that is accountable to itself and not to the 
population at large has become the rule. (Hammami and Kuttab, 1999).
All this new political terrain presented the women’s movement and other social 
movements as well, with difficult dilemmas in developing a strategy that addressed 
both gender issues in the emerging state, linked to the very real conditions of 
Israeli colonial oppression and the real needs of women for independence. In fact, 
a post independence strategy largely dominated with initiatives for legal reform, 
anti-discrimination in government regulations and practices, integration of women 
into ministries, democracy workshops and addressing specific issues like domestic 
violence. (Johnson amd Kuttab, 2001).
Professionalization of the Women’s Movement
The new phenomenon of feminist NGOs in the early nineties came to play a 
prominent and highly controversial role in sustaining the feminist organizations as 
a movement. These NGOs have come to denote particular kinds of groups with 
orientations and practices distinct from those of the historic women’s groups of 
the 1970s and 1980s. Growing numbers of specialized and professional feminist 
NGOs have dedicated themselves to intervening in national and international 
policy processes. 
The expansion of the number of women’s professional organizations (NGOs) 
in the early nineties which advocated for women’s rights has become one of the 
dominant trends in the evolution of the Arab women’s movements as well as 
the Palestinian. Such an increase indicated on one hand the failure of the Arab 
regimes in promoting women’s rights, (Jad 2003), and the failure of the civil society 
organizations to sustain its activity and protect its achievements due to their inability 
to balance between national and gender rights even though they promoted equality 
and social justice as two principles and slogans within the national program and 
as part of their ideological framework and program.(Sabbagh, 1996). In addition, 
although the Palestinian Authority supported women’s rights to a certain level, it did 
not in any way bypass the conditions of Islamic shari’a law, a compromise that was 
made against the Women’s Bill of Rights of 1993 which has declared gender equality 
as one of its main principles. (ibid.) Hence, the inception of these organizations was 
directly an outcome of the absence of internal democracy and indifference of the 
national movement regarding gender issues on one hand, and the political process 
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and peace agreements which created a suitable political environment. In addition to 
the limited space that gender issues were given on the national agenda.
Hence, during the early nineties, more feminist professional NGO institutions 
have mushroomed and developed and started to play a prominent role in 
transforming the local women’s agenda. The vision and practices of these NGOS 
are distinct from those of the historic women’s groups of the 1970s and 1980s 
that were decentralized formations of the national movement. Growing numbers of 
specialized and professional feminist NGOs have dedicated themselves to intervening 
in national and international policy processes. It became obvious that the women’s 
movement leadership sought to use this opportunity and space to impact new 
national policies through specialized and professional work. Consequently, they 
became more noticeable on the national map through receiving funds from bilateral 
and multilateral agencies. They have adopted a new agenda more oriented to policy 
and advocacy and provided expertise for international and national organizations 
for preparation of official preparatory documents and assessment reports.
This structural transformation of institutionalizing women activism in a new 
form of professional organizations marginalized the grass-root input in the making 
of the transition and weakened the historic women’s committees, further de-linking 
women’s issues from the national issues and depoliticizing women’s rights from 
political concerns. (Hammami and Kuttab, 1996). This was often justified through 
an argument of decreasing control and hegemony of the different political factions 
on women’s agendas. This was in addition to the erosion of mass movements and 
the weakening capacity for mass mobilization and democratic representation in 
face of formal political power and peace negotiations or diplomatic processes. 
All this collectively affected negatively the women’s movement’s role, credibility 
and legitimacy. The emergence of political duality within the women’s movement 
separating the public and private; to this de-politicization of gender meant isolating 
the “public” implying to the “national and political”; from the “private” meaning 
“gender” which resulted in the process of de-politicization of women activism. Even 
until now, these challenges have not been tackled or resolved therefore deepening 
further the structural imbalance between women’s rights vis-a- vis women’s practical 
and strategic needs, versus requirements for national liberation struggle. 
Political Culture and the “Global Office”
Another realization that affected the work of the social movements and in 
particular the women’s movement and distorted it from its historical political 
culture is the process of cooption of qualified political and women’s cadres of the 
social movements into NGOs leaving political factions, social movements and 
public institutions deficient from qualified and experienced cadres. Furthermore, 
these cadres who have left political movements and parties have also shifted and 
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changed their style of living, work and expertise loosing their historic attribute for 
resistance, steadfastness and tolerance and developing new norms and values, new 
style of dress, new skills specially tailored for writing proposals, reports, documents 
for workshops, international conferences or assessment reports that are not only 
produced in a random and speedy way that cannot capture the reality of the situation 
of women, but also adopting a set format that does not permit for any creativity or 
reflection which in turn result in the loss of the local heritage and reality expression. 
In addition, as most of these organizations focus on projects rather than programs, 
cadres loose their strategic vision, their analytical abilities and become technical 
instruments for the international and donor community. 
It is worth noting that certain skills that were useful, necessary, and historically 
relevant for grassroots work like organization and mobilization (Jad 2003) have lost 
their functional value and instead technical skills were promoted which were more 
directly linked to the new areas and style of work where presentation and formats, 
or “form” and not “content” became important. All these skills have become more 
important traits for competition among the elite, and at the same time have enlarged 
the gap between the elite women’s leadership and the grass-roots isolating further 
the women’s elite from the masses. 
In addition, through professional work, women’s organizations have divided and 
fragmented the women’s sector into different professional groups according to the 
agenda of the organization and the nature of the service available. Providing partial 
and scattered services compartmentalize women’s struggle and experience and 
limit their ability to see the larger scene. Exaggerated professionalization fragments 
the comprehensive understanding of women’s issues and separates practical and 
strategic gender needs without linking them together. Whereas unifying women 
and mobilizing them against the occupation and patriarchal manifestations in its 
different components would be a more powerful strategy to transform society and 
exert drastic changes on women’s conditions. Dividing confrontation weakens 
women from unifying their efforts in attaining social and political rights.
Looking at the situation of women in general, we find that their conditions have 
deteriorated especially in the aftermath of the second Intifada, and their pressing 
problems like poverty due to unemployment, or imprisonment, or death of their 
husband or sons as breadwinners have not been resolved, their participation in 
the labor market has stayed minimal, their voice in affecting the political process 
has stayed unattended to, and their equal rights at different levels have not been 
achieved. Why this has not been achieved is in my view due to two factors the 
occupation and its destructive consequences on economic, political and social levels 
and the transformation of the social movements including the women’s movements 
into specialized organizations which caters for the global agendas that does not 
include priorities of the majority of ordinary women. 
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Rethinking the Women’s Movement:  
Concluding Remarks
Currently, the Palestinian society continues to suffer not only from a colonial 
occupation but also from a fragmented political system, erosion of civil life, 
profound disintegration of social networks, and class polarization. 
Indeed, the growing demand and competition of NGOs and especially 
women NGOs over funding to sustain their continuity, further deepens relations 
of dependency with the donor community and imposes a global agenda which 
conforms with available funding agenda of the donor community. In addition, the 
continuous and vicious circle where organizations must meet the requirements of 
the donor organizations in terms of conditions, deadlines (which are not realistic) 
and set issues, prohibit them from finding the space and time to rethink or readjust 
their agendas to include or integrate some of the priorities of the masses, which 
are issues that don’t find any funding. Moreover, due to the political vacuum 
that these organizations exist within, and due to the weakness of the democratic 
political parties, there is no pressure exerted on them to re- evaluate their work, or 
make structural adjustments. Finally, due to the structural and cultural changes of 
women’s organizations to adapt to the new model of global organization and style 
of work, it is very difficult to regain the genuine culture of women’s experiences in 
mobilization and organization of masses. 
It is worth noting that although most of the women’s organizations have 
integrated empowerment as a theme in their programs, it is important to remind 
them that women’s empowerment may only be achieved in a context of sovereignty 
and freedom, where human rights and the rule of law are observed within a sovereign 
state and not under colonial occupation This means that as long as Palestinian 
society remains under a colonial occupation which targets the land and the people, 
violates the human rights of men and women, and deprives the people from self-
determination and the right to build a state, it will be impossible to talk about real 
empowerment of women. However, the community and women’s efforts in the 
political struggle which feed into continuous resistance, steadfastness and coping 
should be the new framework to measure Palestinian women’s empowerment. When 
national liberation is linked to social liberation, it will undoubtedly contribute to 
the empowerment process.
As Palestinian women are involved in a national struggle for liberation and self-
determination, they are also engaged in a democratic struggle against patriarchy 
and undemocratic governance and practices that prohibit the realization of social 
justice and gender equality. Moreover, it is difficult to separate individual and 
structural equality as both can play a role in empowering women and at the same 
time democratize the system of governance which can ensure gender equality. A 
balance between structural and individual equality is necessary to ensure democratic 
transformation. In this respect, empowerment would also include individual self-
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determination where individual rights meet with collective women’s rights to result 
in a democratic system that can treat all women and men equally.
Furthermore, it should be noted that empowerment can never be reached when 
a patriarchal system is still the ideological and practical framework where gender 
relations are defined and where women’s subordination and exploitation prevails 
both at the private and public spheres. Hence a women’s movement that can 
confront the system through an organized program and mobilize women against 
patriarchy is a pre-condition to self liberation of women. 
In this context, real empowerment of women must be translated into political 
power that is geared to effective change in existing gender power relations, rather 
than struggling within their current limitations and frameworks. Empowerment 
must not be confined to the empowerment of the individual but must make 
individual aspirations compatible and integral to collective aspirations.
Finally, if women’s organizations continue to speak of equality and empowerment 
in the abstract and in isolation from national liberation issues, it will continue to 
be distant from the masses and the needs of the masses. To make women’s issues 
societal issues, the women’s movement and women’s organizations should go back 
to their original agenda of balancing the national and the social in a workable 
formula that can bridge the gap between the requirements and needs of the elite 
and the masses. 
Endnotes
1 Signed by the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel, and resulted in a peace agreement 
that committed both parties to a series of actions and interim measures including partial Israeli 
territorial withdrawal and limited Palestinian self-government.
2 Neo-liberal regimes, multinational corporations and national regimes have all come.
3 “New Middle East” is the concept that was used by Condoleezza Rice to describe the American 
plan for the region.
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Saba Mahmood’s Politics of Piety:  
The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject 
Lena Meari
In her book Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the 
Feminist Subject (Princeton University Press 2005), Saba 
Mahmood poses a series of conceptual challenges to feminist 
theory in particular, and secular-liberal thought in general. These 
challenges emerge from her careful attention to how Egyptian 
women in the mosque movement – as teachers and learners – 
view themselves as actively constructing meaningful and virtuous 
lives, including taking on roles in public life, while adhering to 
“norms” of female behavior such as modesty, humility and service. 
In this review, Meari probes the significance of Mahmood’s 
rethinking of critical feminist concepts such as women’s agency 
and its relation to resistance and subordination. 
Lena Meari is a doctoral student in Anthropology at the University 
of California-Davis and faculty member at the Institute of Women’s 
Studies.
Politics of Piety is a masterpiece of writing against naturalized theories and 
assumptions. Through ethnographic work with the women’s mosque movement 
in urban Egypt, Saba Mahmood questions well established assumptions in 
feminist theory and secular-liberal thought concerning the ideal of human and 
political agency. 
One of the main goals of the book is to challenge the binary opposition between 
resistance and subordination that is characteristic of secular liberal thought and 
liberal and poststructuralist feminism. Mahmood analyzes the conceptions 
of self, moral agency, and politics that undergird the practices of the Egyptian 
women’s mosque movement, a movement in which women provide lessons to one 
another on Islamic doctrine in order to cultivate an ideal virtuous self. Mahmood 
considers the dilemma that women’s active support of socio-religious movements 
that sustain principles of female subordination poses for feminist analysts. She 
refuses to use the term false-consciousness to resolve the dilemma of women’s 
subordination to feminine virtues, such as shyness and modesty. Moreover, she 
does not try to portray women’s resistance to the dominant male order and their 
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subversion of the hegemonic meanings of cultural practices, the focus of the work 
of a number of other feminist scholars. Rather, she explores how the focus on 
agency and the assumptions underlying this focus can constitute a barrier to the 
exploration of movements such as the one she addresses. 
Mahmood argues that human agency is not limited to acts that challenge 
social norms. By claiming that agentival capacity is “entailed not only in those 
acts that resist norms but also in the multiple ways in which one inhabits norms” 
(Mahmood 2005, 15), Mahmood defies the normative liberal assumptions about 
human nature, the belief that all human beings have an innate desire for freedom 
and autonomy, and that human agency consists of acts that challenge social 
norms. 
Mahmood begins her argumentation on agency and resistance by reviewing 
the works of well-known anthropologists such as Janice Boddy and Lila Abu-
Lughod about the multiple forms of women’s agency. While she recognizes the 
“crucial role” scholarly attention to women’s agency played in “complicating and 
expanding debates about gender in non-Western societies,” (Mahmood 2005, 
6), Mahmood also critiques the failure to “problematize the universality of 
the desire - central to liberal and progressive thought and presupposed by the 
concept of resistance it authorizes - to be free from relations of subordination 
and, for women, from structures of male domination” (Mahmood 2005,10). 
Mahmood criticizes the use of the term resistance to describe a whole range of 
human actions including those which may be socially, ethically, or politically 
indifferent to the goal of opposing hegemonic norms. She argues that feminist 
assumptions reflect a deep tension within feminism caused by its dual character as 
both an analytical and a politically prescriptive project. She states that according 
to the humanist and feminist tradition, in order for an individual to be free, his 
actions must be the consequence of his own will rather than of custom, tradition, 
and norms. Consequently, agency is coupled with resistance and subversion of 
external imposed norms and relations of domination. Instead, Mahmood invites 
her readers to rethink resistance and agency. 
Following Foucault, Butler and other thinkers, Mahmood conceptualizes 
agency not as a synonym for resistance to relations of domination, but as a capacity 
for action that specific relations of subordination create and enable. In contrast 
to the tradition of feminist scholarship that treated norms as an external social 
imposition that constrain the individual, Mahmood accepts the theoretical frame 
that challenge the external-internal opposition by arguing that social norms are 
the necessary ground through which the subject is realized and comes to enact her 
agency. Mahmood also accepts Butler`s notion that “to the degree that the stability 
of social norms is a function of their repeated enactment, agency is grounded in 
the essential openness of each iteration and the possibility that it may fail or be re-
signified for purposes other than the consolidation of norms”. (Mahmood 2005). 
Nevertheless, Mahmood also criticizes Butler’s notion of agency, which tends to 
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focus only on the operations of power that resignify and subvert norms.
Drawing on her work with the women’s mosque movement, Mahmood 
argues that norms “are not only consolidated and\or subverted... but performed, 
inhabited, and experienced in a variety of ways” (Mahmood 2005, 22). 
Furthermore, Mahmood calls for uncoupling the analytical notion of agency from 
the politically prescriptive project of feminism, because feminist scholarship’s 
emphasis on the politically subversive forms of agency ignores other modalities of 
agency whose meaning and effect are not captured within the logic of subversion 
and resignification of hegemonic terms of discourse (Mahmood 2005, 153). 
For example, the mosque participants` attachment to patriarchal forms of life 
provides the necessary conditions for both their subordination and their agency. 
This idea can be illustrated through the life of a group of women that Mahmood 
describes in her ethnography. These women aspire to maintain a pious lifestyle 
and cultivate the virtue of shyness or modesty (al-haya). To achieve their goal the 
women need to struggle against the secular ethos that surround them in addition 
to the internal struggle within themselves. 
Mahmood proceeds to explore the issue of manifest norms and ethical 
formation. Unlike the work of Pierre Bourdieu and other scholars, Mahmood 
is not interested in the question of what a particular ethical theory means, but 
in what it does. In dealing with the mosque participant’s ethics she draws on 
Foucault’s notion about “virtue ethics” and his argument that ethics are always 
local and particular and pertain to a specific set of procedures, techniques, and 
discourses through which highly specific ethical-moral subjects come to be 
formed. Mahmood perceives the women’s mosque movement as a moral reform 
movement. At the same time, she stresses the relationship between the ethical and 
the political within such movements. 
Driven by her theoretical frame, Mahmood tries through her ethnography to 
capture the experiences and concerns of the participants in the women’s mosque 
movement. For instance, she explores: the diverse pedagogical styles of the 
“da`iyat”; the women’s concerns for learning to organize their daily life according 
to Islamic standards of virtuous conduct in a world increasingly ordered by a logic 
of secular rationality; as well as the relationship between bodily behavior and the 
pious self. In order to investigate the relationship between bodily behavior and 
the pious self, Mahmood (2001, 2005) employs some Foucauldian conceptions 
of the self and the ethical subject formation in order to analyze how the women’s 
mosque movement in Egypt cultivate the virtue of shyness as essential to their 
piety. Mahmood writes: “Although piety was achievable through practices that 
were both devotional as well as worldly in character, it required more than 
the simple performance of acts: piety also entailed the inculcation of entire 
dispositions through a simultaneous training of the body, emotions, and reason 
as sites of discipline until the religious virtues acquired the status of embodied 
habits” (Mahmood 2001: 212). Mahmood elaborates on the relationship 
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between memory, bodily acts, and the constitution of the self by destabilizing 
the distinction between innate human desires and outward forms of conduct or 
at least problematizing the direction of these desires: “Instead of innate human 
desires eliciting outward forms of conduct, it is the sequence of practices and 
actions one is engaged in that determines one’s desires and emotions… it is 
through repeated bodily acts that one trains one’s memory, desire and intellect to 
behave according to established standards of conduct” (Mahmood 2001: 214). 
For instance Mahmood introduces the narrative of Amal who wants to cultivate 
the virtue of shyness while she does not actually feel it inside herself. Amal 
describes how she realized that she can make herself shy even if it means to create 
it until the sense of shyness imprints itself on her interior being.
Mahmood`s conceptualization of agency constitutes a theoretical shift away 
from treating resistance and human agency as universal and inherent characteristics 
of subjects` practices. Further, Mahmood’s illustration of how the embodied 
practices and actions of the pious women determine their desires and emotions is 
provocative. These notions could shed light on some aspects of the experiences, 
motivations and desires of Palestinian pious women in general and Palestinian 
women members in Islamic parties in particular. Those women are perceived by 
most International and local feminist scholars and activists (influenced by the 
liberal-secular conceptions) as victims of false consciousness and lacking of any 
kind of agency. 
Nevertheless, I think that Mahmood`s theoretical focus on the ways in which 
Egyptian pious women inhabit norms limits the comprehensive understanding of 
the women’s mosque movement as part of the complex phenomena of the Islamic 
revival and it’s ethical, social, economic, class and political intersected aspects. In 
addition, Mahmood`s work does not consider the singularity of the women and 
their diverse motivations and practices and treats the participants of the mosque 
movement as a homogenous group. By treating the participants of the mosque 
movement as a homogenous group, Mahmood neglects class differences and the 
diverse and contradicted thoughts and emotions of these women. 
The focus of the work on the ethical formation of the Muslim subject does 
not take into consideration the postcolonial or neo-colonial context of Egypt: 
the ethnographic site, and how this context affects the movement. Additionally, 
Mahmood’s focus on the conception of agency as upholding rather than resisting 
norms is compelling, though partial (as she herself states). Focusing on other 
aspects of women’s lives and experiences might reveal other modalities of their 
agency; modalities that might include more than inhabiting and upholding norms, 
and there might be complex ways of intersection between the different modalities 
of agency. Some aspects of the women’s pious practices that Mahmood interprets 
in her ethnography as inhabiting norms might be interpreted in a more complex 
way as simultaneously inhabiting and subverting norms through providing new 
significations to these norms. 
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Finally, Mahmood’s portrayal of the Egyptian pious women as the “Radical 
Other” of the liberal feminists and their conceptions of women fixes both groups 
of women and overlooks the complications and contradictions within each 
group.
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